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The Paradox of Spontaneous Formation of Private Legal Systems
Amitai Aviram*
Scholarship on private legal systems (PLS) explains the evolution of norms
created and enforced by PLSs, but rarely addresses the evolution of institutions that form
PLSs. Such institutions are assumed to form spontaneously (unless suppressed by law)
when law is either unresponsive or incapable of directing behavior in welfaremaximizing manners.
But, as this paper demonstrates, PLSs typically cannot form spontaneously. Newly
formed PLSs cannot enforce cooperation since the effectiveness of mechanisms used to
secure this cooperation (e.g., the threat of exclusion) depends on the PLS’s ability to
confer benefits to its members, and newly formed PLSs do not yet confer such benefits.
Successful PLSs bypass this barrier by building on extant foundations—
preexisting institutions that already benefit members, typically through functions
requiring less costly enforcement. The threat of losing preexisting benefits disciplines
members to abide by the PLSs’ rules, which in turn allows the PLSs to regulate behavior.
This pattern indicates that rather than developing spontaneously, PLSs develop in
phases, initially facilitating activities that are unrelated to regulating behavior and incur
lower enforcement costs, the provision of which enables the PLS to regulate behavior in
the second stage. The paper suggests normative applications of this observation in the
fields of antitrust, critical infrastructure protection and corporate governance.
I. Introduction: Pax Dei as a Parable
Life in Western Europe of the late Tenth Century was, for most people, dismal
and unsafe. The decline of the Carolingian Empire created a political vacuum and
intensified decentralizing forces that had plagued the Empire from its inception.
Throughout the region, independent warlords consolidated power through private
warfare, unhindered by the ineffective central government.1 Peasants were among the
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1
On the Pax Dei movement and conditions in Western Europe at the time of the movement’s birth, see:
Thomas F. Head & Richard A. Landes (eds.), The Peace of God: Social Violence and Religious Response
Around the Year 1000 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992); also see: Peace of God: Pax Dei,
available at: http://www.mille.org/people/rlpages/paxdei.html.
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main victims of this warfare, since breaching a fortified stronghold was far more difficult
than starving it out by destroying the surrounding fields.
Mutual destruction of farms was an unattractive result even to a heartless warlord,
but it was the most logical action for each of them: if the warlord’s rival was expected to
show mercy on the warlord’s peasants, then attacking the rival’s peasants would bring
quick and decisive victory. And if the rival would show no mercy, then certainly the
warlord’s only chance was to preemptively strike the rival’s peasants.
In some similar situations, this gloomy outcome could be averted either through
intervention by a third party capable of enforcing its will on the opposing parties, or
through self-restraint driven by a desire to create a reputation of fairness, foreseeing the
benefit such a reputation can yield in future encounters with the same rival or with others
who have learned of the magnanimous party’s reputation. But in West Frankland of the
Tenth Century, central government was too weak to assume the role of the third party
enforcer, and reputation was of little use, since a warlord whose mercifulness was taken
advantage of, even just once, would likely die, precluding any future benefit from the
benevolent reputation.
The bleak dynamic of mutual destruction was stopped, however, by a unique
institution that surfaced in response to the situation: Pax Dei (Latin for ‘Peace of God’)—
one of the world’s first decentralized, popular peace movements. The movement formed
rules regulating warfare—prohibiting a combatant from harming non-combatants,
suspending warfare during the harvest season and during times of religious significance
(e.g., during Lent and the Sabbath), etc.
These rules were not promulgated by a king or parliament. Rather, they were
voluntarily undertaken by the warlords, who swore an oath to abide by the rules in the
presence of large crowds of commoners. These crowds gathered around saints’ relics, on
which the warlords typically swore their commitments. The enthusiasm and religious
fervor driving this movement were great. A chronicler of that time, Ralph (Raoul) Glaber
describes one such gathering: “At this all were inflamed with such ardour that through the
hands of their bishops they raised the pastoral staff to heaven, while themselves with
outspread palms and with one voice cried to God: Peace, peace, peace! -that this might be
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a sign of perpetual covenant for that which they had promised between themselves and
God.” 2
Though voluntary, the warlords’ participation was not necessarily desired by
them. Some, perhaps, would willingly refrain from destruction if assured that their rivals
would. Other, more ambitious warlords were driven to participate by fear of crossing
both the large, enthusiastic crowds and divine will. Unlike governmental decree, the
oaths were not enforced by a force stronger than the violating warlords. In this
fragmented region, such a force did not exist. Rather, violations of the oath were
punished by social and religious ostracism.
The Pax Dei movement provides a colorful example of the formation of a private
legal system (also known as ‘private ordering’)3—a non-governmental institution
intended to regulate the behavior of its members.4 It also offers a good starting point to
examine how private legal systems evolve. Pax Dei formed around a religious, mystical
social network that centered on the belief that the peace oaths were a covenant with God.
Why did it require the aid of religion, rather than spontaneously form among the people
in response to a need for order to which government could not respond?5 Is there a
2

Ralph Glaber, Miracles de Saint-Benoit, available at: http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/source/glaber1000.html.
3
This paper regards as ‘private legal systems’ not only complex systems that bear resemblance to legal
codes (e.g., the Law Merchant), but also more minimal institutions with less elaborately formulated rules,
such as those causing most of us to stand in a queue, to be polite to strangers, etc.
4
Though usually discernable, the dichotomy between public and private legal systems is not always a clear
one. Some private legal systems have a significant public backing and are very similar to public legal
systems. For example, the King of England enacted in 1353 the “Statute of the Staple”, which prohibited
Common Law courts from hearing disputes arising from contracts made on the staple markets (markets for
important commodities, such as wool). Instead, the statute created Staple Courts and instructed them to
apply the (privately formed) law merchant. Thus, private law was given exclusive jurisdiction by public
decree. See Todd J. Zywicki, The Rise and Fall of Efficiency in the Common Law: A Supply-Side Analysis,
__ Northwestern L. Rev. __ (forthcoming 2003), at part III.B.1.b.iii.
Conversely, some public legal forums defer to private ordering (e.g., arbitration proceedings), and some
public legal forums compete with other legal fora, and thus act more like private legal systems. For
example, the Common Law developed in England from the rulings of judges of the Court of King’s Bench.
For centuries this court had competed with several other royal courts (notably the Court of the Exchequer
and the Court of Common Pleas), the ecclesiastical courts, town and feudal courts, and merchant courts.
Id., at part III.B.1.a. Though the courts had, in theory, limits to their jurisdictions, they each used legal
fictions to expand their reach. Id. As Adam Smith noted, this led to improved quality and impartiality of
judicial decisions. Adam Smith, An Inquiry Into the Nature and Causes of The Wealth of Nations, at Book
V, Chapter 1, part 22, p. 241-242.
5
For example, the peasants could collectively pay the warlords to spare them, or better yet—intimidate the
warlords by threatening that an attack on any peasant would result in violent retaliation by all peasants,
who though less well armed and trained, were large enough in number to overwhelm the warlord’s
companions. This would require coordination between the peasants, but so did Pax Dei.

The Paradox of Spontaneous Formation of Private Legal Systems/Amitai Aviram

4

pattern that can help us predict what institutions would undertake to regulate behavior
and facilitate private legal systems?
The private ordering literature examines the institutions facilitating a private legal
system (at a point in which the system has fully evolved), and tracks the evolution of
rules that are created and enforced by the private legal system,6 but the literature pays
scant attention to how the institutions themselves evolved to become a private legal
system. Perhaps drawing on Ronald Coase’s theorem and assuming negligible transaction
costs,7 and perhaps expanding on Friedrich Hayek’s theory of spontaneous order,8 most
of the literature treats private legal systems as spontaneous creations that sprout in
response to a governance need unfulfilled by government. Even the private ordering
literature that explicitly addresses the existence of high transaction costs focuses, with
rare exception, not on the effects of these costs on the evolution of institutions, but on
what institutions eventually evolved.9
This paper attempts to contribute to filling the gap, by suggesting a theory on how
(and which) institutions evolve into private legal systems by undertaking the function of
regulating behavior.10 Private legal systems typically do not form spontaneously, but
build on existing institutional infrastructure—networks11 that have existing functions
6

See, e.g.: Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the
Diamond Industry, 21 J. Legal Stud. 115 (1992); Karen Clay, Trade Without Law: Private-Order
Institutions in Mexican California, 13 J.L. Econ. & Org. 202 (1997); Robert C. Ellickson, A Hypothesis of
Wealth- Maximizing Norms: Evidence from the Whaling Industry, 5 J.L. Econ. & Org. 83 (1989); Robert C.
Ellickson, Order Without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University
Press, 1991); Avner Greif, Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in Early Trade: The
Maghribi Traders' Coalition, 83 Am. Econ. Rev. 525 (1993); Curtis J. Milhaupt & Mark D. West, The
Dark Side of Private Ordering: An Institutional and Empirical Analysis of Organized Crime, 67 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 41 (2000); David G. Oedel, Private Interbank Discipline, 16 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol’y 327 (1993).
7
On Coase’s theorem and its relation to private legal systems see discussion infra, in Section II.1 of this
paper.
8
See Friedrich A. Hayek, Law, Legislation & Liberty (University of Chicago Press, Vol. 1, 1973; Vol. 2,
1976; Vol. 3, 1979).
9
See, e.g., Robert C. Ellickson, Of Coase and Cattle: Dispute Resolution among Neighbors in Shasta
County, 38 Stan. L. Rev. 623 (1986); Robert C. Ellickson & Charles D. Thorland, Ancient Land Law:
Mesopotamia, Egypt, Israel, 71 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 321, 324-327 (1995). The exception is: Avner Greif,
Paul Milgrom & Barry R. Weingast, Coordination, Commitment, and Enforcement: The Case of the
Merchant Guild, 102 J. Pol. Econ. 745 (1994). This paper discusses the evolution of a specific institution of
that became a private legal system—the merchant guild. This paper’s contribution will be discussed infra,
especially in Section II.2.
10
A ‘function’ is a service the network provides its members. For example: social interaction; spiritual
support; facilities to exchange goods; regulation of members’ behavior, etc.
11
‘Networks’ are institutions that facilitate interconnection between users of a good or service exhibiting
network effects, and thus enable the realization of the network effects. Network effects (or network
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other than regulating behavior. Private legal systems lacking existing functionality cannot
operate effectively (except in rare situations of very low enforcement costs), because of a
‘chicken and egg’-type of paradox, which this paper calls the paradox of spontaneous
formation: to efficiently direct behavior they must ensure the cooperation of their
members, but the effectiveness of the mechanisms used to secure this cooperation (e.g.,
the threat of exclusion) depends on the ability to confer benefits to the members—
primarily the ability (not yet existing for a spontaneously formed private legal system) to
efficiently direct behavior.
This problem may, in theory, be solved through a bonding mechanism that assures
the members of the spontaneous private legal system (i.e., a newly formed system not
based on a preexisting network)12 of their mutual abidance to the rules. But, as will be
explained below, bonding of this sort is very expensive, often outweighing the benefits
conferred by the private legal system and at the very least making the spontaneous
formation of a private legal system more costly, and therefore less attractive, than
evolving an existing network into a private legal system by having it regulate the
behavior of members it had served in other ways hitherto.
To illustrate, let us consider an alternative private legal system that could have
formed instead of Pax Dei. The peasants in a region could have convened and agreed to
pool their forces and intimidate the warlords into undertaking oaths restricting warfare.
This would certainly benefit all the peasants. However, each peasant would know that if
he supported this movement while others shirked, the movement would fail and he would
be punished for his participation. At this point, the incipient collaboration has no effect
on the warlords (as it had yet to act), and may or may not succeed. Given the risk of
benefits) are demand-side economies of scale. That is, the phenomena that the utility to a user of a good or
service increases as additional people use it. Often (though not always) realization of network effects
requires interconnection between the users through a network. Networks are often well-suited to regulate
behavior, because they are efficient in employing certain enforcement mechanisms. See Amitai Aviram,
Regulation by Networks, 2003 BYU Law Review ___ (forthcoming 2003), working paper version available
at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=387960.
12
The term ‘spontaneously formed’ private legal system is used, rather than ‘new’ private legal system,
because an existing network that has hitherto provided a low enforcement cost function (e.g., social
interaction) and has now evolved to provide another, higher enforcement cost function (e.g., restriction of
warfare) would be a ‘new’ private legal system in respect to regulating the latter function. However, the
preexisting functionality is an important difference in the system’s ability to regulate, and therefore a term
in needed to distinguish between a completely new (‘spontaneously formed’) system and an existing
system that has now begun to regulate a new function.
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joining a failed movement, each of the peasants is expected to shirk. They might try to
form some bonding mechanism to ensure each other of the others’ participation. If the
movement only required the collaboration of a handful of people, perhaps each could
offer collateral to assure of his participation. This is prohibitively expensive when the
collaboration requires the participation of hundreds if not thousands of impoverished
peasants. But even if the cost of these bonds did not outweigh the benefit from the
collaboration, it is certainly more expensive than the alternative—evolving an existing,
religious social network into a private legal system by adding to its existing functions the
regulation of behavior regarding warfare.
Consider the system that actually evolved: The Christian social network in
Western Europe of that era provided its members with significant spiritual benefits—a
sense of belonging to a community, a sense of security derived from belief in divine
oversight, etc. Any person reneging on what was perceived to be a covenant with God
would be excommunicated, losing the benefits religion provided. The ability to threaten
exclusion from the religious group thus facilitated the cooperation of even those members
of the group who personally believed that breaking the peace oaths would not incur
divine wrath (as long as they did anticipate that the group will exclude them for breaking
the oaths).
This paper explores the effect of the existing functionality of a network on its
ability to evolve into a private legal system. Differences in characteristics of existing
functions significantly affect the cost of regulating behavior. Key characteristics that
affect enforcement costs are the utility conferred by the network to the members (i.e., the
importance of the network’s preexisting functions to the members), the degree of
divergence in this utility among members, and the function’s “game type” (e.g.,
Prisoners’ Dilemma, Chicken, Battle of the Sexes, Stag Hunt, etc.)—that is, members’
ranking of preferences between mutual contribution to the function, mutual defection
from the function, contribution to the function while others defect, or defecting from
contribution while others contribute. “Game types” will be explained in detail, below.13
Since policing cartel agreements is a form of regulating behavior (though in a
specific, narrow scope of activity), many of the criteria that increase a network’s ability
13

Each of these games will be explained infra, in Section III.
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to regulate behavior have been examined in the antitrust scholarship, as criteria that make
cartels more stable.14 The “game type” criteria, however, has not been examined by this
scholarship, since cartel enforcement is almost always of the Prisoners’ Dilemma type.
This neglected aspect will be emphasized in the paper.15
The rest of the paper will introduce a method for analysis of the evolution of
private legal systems and apply these analytical tools on prominent case studies in the
private ordering literature. Section II will introduce the theory of how private legal
systems evolve. It will show the flaws in the extant literature’s implied assumption that
private legal systems form spontaneously.16 It will then explain, assisted by a model
created by Greif, Milgrom and Weingast,17 why decentralized bonding is unlikely to
assure the members of the private legal system sufficiently to ensure an efficient level of
behavior regulation by the system.18 Then it will examine the role of existing functions of
a network in lowering its costs of enforcing a private legal system, and suggest the
criteria that determine which of several existing networks has the lowest enforcement
costs (and therefore is likely to evolve into a private legal system).19
After discussing these criteria, the paper will focus in Section III on one key
criterion—the ‘game type’ of the preexisting function. A taxonomy of relevant game
types (Prisoners’ Dilemma, Meeting Place, Battle of the Sexes, etc.) will be offered.
These tools will be applied in Section IV, which will revisit leading case studies in the
literature on private legal systems, and will note the pattern of each system’s evolution, to
the extent it can be gathered from those studies.

14

See: George J. Stigler, A Theory of Oligopoly, 72 J. Pol. Econ. 44 (1964); Andrew R. Dick, When Are
Cartels Stable Contracts?, 39 J. L. & Econ. 241 (1996).
15
Some of the private ordering literature has made use of game theoretic tools. However, they examined
the game type of the regulated activity, not that of the preexisting function. For example, Ellickson
examined a game type he termed “specialized labor”, which would fit the payoff structure of two people
having to decide whether to participate in building a fence, or shirking from this duty. See Ellickson (1991),
supra note 6, at pp. 162-164. Ensuring an efficient participation in building a fence is among the behaviors
the private legal system (in Ellickson’s case, the regional social network in Shasta County) attempts to
regulate, not the preexisting functions it provided before regulating behavior (like a sense of community).
The evolutionary process of private legal systems depends more on the game type of the latter, however.
Typically, providing a sense of community is a Meeting Place game. See infra, Section III.2.
16
Infra, in Section II.1.
17
Greif, Milgrom & Weingast, supra note 9, at pp. 751-752, 762-766.
18
Infra, in Section II.2.
19
Infra, in Section II.3.
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This literature—Ellickson’s studies of Cattle Trespass,20 Bernstein’s examination
of exchanges and trade associations,21 Greif’s22 and Clay’s23 analysis of merchant
coalitions, and other works—offer a rich variety of private legal systems, evolving from
networks that follow different characteristics and in particular different game types. The
methodology described earlier in the paper will assist in evaluating why in each case that
specific network had been the lowest cost enforcer and therefore had evolved into a
private legal system.
Besides shedding light on an aspect often neglected in the private ordering
literature, the paper provides a foundation for some normative analysis. This, as well as a
summary of the arguments advanced in this paper, will be set forth in conclusion of the
paper, in Section V.
II. A Theory on the Evolution of Private Legal Systems’ Institutions
A. The Paradox of Spontaneous Formation
Nobel laureate Ronald Coase anticipated a significant role for private legal
systems. In a world with no transaction costs, states one form of the Coase theorem,
inefficient entitlements granted by law would be renegotiated to efficiently allocate
entitlements.24 For example, suppose that tort law imposes liability on a rancher whose
cattle trespasses into a farmer’s land. In some regions, this rule may be inefficient,
perhaps because there are many ranchers and very few farmers, so it is cheaper to fence
out the farms and have the cattle roam freely in the pasture, than fence in the cattle.25 If
transaction costs are negligible, having this inefficient rule will not result in an inefficient
outcome. Instead, the ranchers would agree with the farmers to pay the farmers to fence
themselves out, and then the ranchers would let the cattle freely roam. This is feasible,
since the cost for the ranchers to comply with the rule and fence their cattle in would be
greater than the cost of fencing the farms in (this is why the rule is inefficient). As a
20

Ellickson (1991), supra note 6; Ellickson, supra note 9.
Bernstein, supra note 6; Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating
Cooperation Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 Mich. L. Rev. 1724 (2001).
22
Greif, supra note 6.
23
Clay, supra note 6.
24
Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & Econ. 1 (1960).
25
Private ordering of liability for cattle trespass is a central issue in Ellickson (1991), supra note 6, and in
Ellickson, supra note 9.
21
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result, the ranchers would be happy to bear the lesser cost of fencing out the farmers, plus
a small premium to get the farmers’ consent. The farmers, on the other hand, would agree
to opt into the private regime in return for this small consent premium, since the private
regime does not increase their exposure to trespass risk (under the public (legal) regime,
they would be compensated through tort law for the trespass; under the private regime
they would be fenced out, preventing the trespass).
In other words, in a world with no transaction costs private legal systems will
form spontaneously, through ad hoc contracting. Of course, no such world exists. There
are costs to identifying what is the efficient regime and negotiating its terms with all
stakeholders. When there are many ranchers and many farmers, there might be free riding
or hold out problems, or other forms of strategic (or irrational) behavior that could
prevent an efficient bargain from being reached. And of course, there are enforcement
problems, that become acute when parties perform their part of the bargain nonsimultaneously, or if law (i.e., the public regime) does not recognize the private regime
and allows parties to sue and receive their entitlements under law at any time, even if
they purported to contract those away.
Scholars have recognized long ago that institutions form to reduce these
transaction costs. Some institutions solve collective action problems by appointing an
agent (e.g., a trade association) to act on their collective behalf (thus coordinating their
actions);26 other institutions ensure the enforceability of the private regime (e.g., through
mandatory arbitration);27 and others still cure or mitigate additional causes of transaction
costs.
No institution reduces transaction costs to zero. However, the lower the
transaction costs, the closer the parties get to the efficient allocation of entitlements. The
institutions that reduce transaction costs the most are usually adopted. Therefore, the
prevalent institutions are likely to be ones than reduce transaction costs in devising,
negotiating and enforcing private regimes.
26

See, e.g., Avner Greif, Reputation and Coalitions in Medieval Trade: Evidence on the Maghribi Traders,
49 J. Econ. Hist. 857 (1989). For an expanded discussion of institutions facilitating collective actions see:
Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action (Cambridge
University Press, 1990).
27
See, e.g., Bernstein, supra note 6, at pp. 124-130, 132-135, 148-151, 153-157 (discussing the use of
arbitration among diamond dealers to enforce their private legal system).
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Networks are very often the most efficient private regulators.28 Utilization of
network effects empowers four mechanisms, which are frequently more effective than
government or bilateral arrangements in mitigating opportunistic behavior. The first of
these mechanisms is the information mechanism—collecting & disseminating
information on the credibility of member firms. This mechanism, which facilitates the
development of reputation capital, is more powerful when used by a network, due to the
lower monitoring costs by a network of its members, the economies of scale in gathering
and verifying the information, and the credibility of the network as a provider of negative
information on its members. The private ordering literature frequently discusses
manifestations of this mechanism, and in most cases these mechanisms are employed by
networks (e.g., reputation conveying mechanisms in merchant coalitions described in
Greif’s29 and Clay’s30 papers; gossip among neighbors described in Ellickson’s paper;31
etc.).
The second mechanism is the switching mechanism - replacing a defaulted
transaction with an alternative one, with minimal loss of transaction-specific investment.
Typical bilateral examples are a buyer covering for a contract breached by the seller or a
seller reselling goods sold under a contract breached by the buyer; both are remedies
recognized by the Uniform Commercial Code:32 the party injured by a breach of contract
enters another contract, with someone else, that most closely resembles the breached
contract. This minimizes the injured party’s harm from the breach and sometimes deters
the breaching party from threatening a breach. An example of the deterrence of such
opportunism was provided in a paper by Thomas Palay.33 His paper describes how
railroads and shippers contract to reduce the risk of opportunism resulting from the need
to make a transaction-specific investment to ship certain goods by rail. Specially-fitted
rail cars are needed to safely transport certain goods, and this feature exposes one of the

28

See Aviram, supra note 11, at Section II.2. The following paragraphs summarize some of the arguments
made in this paper.
29
Greif, supra note 6, at 526, 528-531.
30
Clay, supra note 6, at 208-212.
31
Ellickson, supra note 9, at 677-678. Ellickson (1991), supra note 6, at 57-58, 180-182, 210, 213-215,
232-233.
32
Uniform Commercial Code §2-706 (seller’s right to resell), §2-712 (buyer’s right to cover).
33
See: Thomas M. Palay, Comparative Institutional Economics: The Governance of Rail Freight
Contracting, 13 J. of L. & Econ. 265 (1984).
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parties to opportunistic renegotiation of the contract by the other party: once one of the
parties—a railroad or a shipper—made this investment, the other party would be in a
position to renegotiate the terms of the contracts in its favor, knowing that its partner
would lose the transaction-specific investment it made if it refused to renegotiate the
transaction. Palay examined what elements of the transaction assure the vulnerable party
against this risk of renegotiation. He found that one of the important assurances was the
knowledge of the potentially opportunistic party that the other party could contract with
another party without losing much of its transaction-specific investment.34
While Palay describes a bilateral switching mechanism (one bilateral transaction
is negotiated in lieu of another bilateral transaction that has been breached), the switching
mechanism is usually more effective when it benefits from network effects. Transacting
within networks tends to mimic perfect competition better than bilateral contracting, and
therefore the market that serves as an alternative to the defaulted transaction is more
liquid. Also, investments used to transact within a network tend to be less transactionspecific, and therefore can be salvaged from the defaulted deal and be used in an
alternative transaction. For example, good reputation may be required for certain
transactions. In a world of bilateral contracting, it takes time and effort to establish a
good reputation. If Jill had only established a good reputation with one transacting
partner (Jack), she may reluctantly acquiesce to Jack’s opportunistic renegotiation of the
transaction, knowing that if she refused to renegotiate and the transaction were
abandoned, she would have to expend a lot of time and effort in establishing a good
reputation with another person. If Jack and Jill transacted through a network (e.g., eBay),
however, then Jill’s reputation would be established network-wide. If Jack threatened to
discontinue transacting unless his new demands were met, Jill could almost costlessly
transact with someone else. Therefore, Jack would be deterred from demanding to
renegotiate in the first place.35
The third mechanism used by networks to regulate is the control mechanism. In
some networks, all transactions are processed through some centralized facilities. For
34

Palay, id., at pp. 271-273.
Unlike the other three mechanisms, the switching mechanism does not require the implementation of any
rules in order to have effect. The very existence of a network produces both the harm mitigation and the
deterrent effects. Nonetheless, this mechanism is no different from the other three in differentiating the
abilities of networks to regulate behavior.

35
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example, the electricity grid is centrally managed, and can facilitate transactions between
many power generators and power consumers. Similarly, transactions in electronic
marketplaces are often facilitated centrally through the marketplace’s server, which
records the terms of the transaction. This centralized transacting facility reduces the cost
of monitoring transactions to detect prohibited behavior, and may serve not only to deter
but to prevent harmful (e.g., fraudulent or illegal) transactions, by blocking them. In such
manner, for example, eBay can prevent unlawful ticket scalping by delisting offers that
violate state anti-scalping laws (prevention), or by reporting such transactions ex post to
the relevant attorney general (detection, which leads to deterrence).36 Alternatively, the
central facility may be kept transparent, allowing individuals to observe and detect norm
violations.37 As with the other mechanisms, the control mechanism may exist in nonnetworked environments. However, economies of scale often make centralized
transacting facilities more feasible in networks than in bilateral transactions, as in the
former both total transaction volume and transaction complexity tend to be higher.
Finally, the fourth mechanism used by networks to regulate is the exclusion
mechanism—the ability to deny a firm the network benefits of transacting with all the
other network members, by excluding the firm from the network, either temporarily
(suspension) or permanently (expulsion). This can be seen as an enhancement of the
information mechanism, by including an additional element—coordination of the
network members’ responses to the information provided. This ensures that the totality of
the network’s transacting power and network effects are denied from the opportunistic
party.
The efficient use of these four mechanisms makes networks, in many cases, the
least-cost regulator. However, these mechanisms are ineffective when they form
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See: Troy Wolverton, Online ticket market pressures scalpers, CNet News.com, May 21, 2002, available
at: http://msn.com.com/2100-1106-918772.html. It should be noted, however, that ticket scalping
specifically proves to be a more difficult field for networks to combat fraud, because of the great
discrepancy between state laws on this matter and the large number of cross-jurisdiction transactions,
which raise ambiguity as to the applicable law. See: Will Courtney, Are online auctions guilty of escalping?, The Eagle-Tribune, March 4, 2001, available at:
http://www.eagletribune.com/news/stories/20010304/FP_004.htm; Will the Net end ticket scalping?,
MSNBC.com, Sept. 2, 1999, available at: http://zdnet.com.com/2100-11-501311.html?legacy=zdnn.
37
For example, some sport teams monitor eBay auctions to detect ticket scalping. See: Allan Drury, When
it comes to ticket scalping, the Net's the Wild West, USA Today, Oct. 7, 2002, available at:
http://www.usatoday.com/tech/webguide/internetlife/2002-10-07-e-scalping_x.htm.
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spontaneously (i.e., imposed for the first time, and unassisted by other, existing
enforcement mechanism), due to a “chicken & egg” paradox:38 they are very effective in
enforcing behavior once they are perceived as able to enforce, but cannot enforce
behavior effectively as long as the network members do not perceive them as able to do
so. Therefore, these enforcement mechanisms would rarely form spontaneously; absent
existing enforcement power, they would not be as effective as other methods of
regulation (e.g., government regulation; bilateral self-regulation, etc.).
Consider, for example, the exclusion mechanism. To enforce a norm, the network
threatens its members with ostracism if they fail to conform. The significance of this
threat to the member depends on what this ostracism would deny him. In other words,
what benefits he currently derives from the network. An established network already
provides benefits to the members; even a network doing nothing but preventing
opportunistic behavior will provide its members with a more amicable transacting
environment once it is effective. But until the network has undertaken enforcement for a
while and has assured members of its ability to function, its members significantly
discount (or do not consider at all) the purported benefits from membership, and will not
be deterred by the threat of exclusion. This becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy as the
more skeptical members ignore the threat of exclusion and act opportunistically,
dissipating the network’s benefits and persuading those members who initially had faith
in the network that the benefit of the network, and hence the cost of exclusion, is
negligible.
The same pattern occurs with the other enforcement mechanisms. The switching
mechanism, for example, can only deter opportunism if the would-be opportunistic party
anticipates that its victim would find an alternative viable transaction. Until the network
is active and has proven its ability to offer feasible alternative transactions, would-be
opportunists would likely not view it as a deterrent to renegotiating the transaction. As a
result honest parties, experiencing a high incidence of opportunistic renegotiation, will
avoid this network and seek either another, more effective network or alternative
regulation (bilateral contracting or government intervention). The abandonment of the
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The term “chicken & egg” paradox makes a reference to the jesting question “which came first, the
chicken or the egg?”. If the chicken came first, what did it hatch from? If the egg—who laid it?
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network by honest members will further exacerbate the problem of finding a feasible
alternative transaction, thus weakening the switching mechanism once more.
This paradox does not have to conclude with the desertion of all members. Not all
network members are identical. Some find it almost costless to follow the norms, and do
so regardless of the perceived effectiveness of the enforcement mechanisms. Other
network members benefit so much from the network (as opposed to the next best
alternative available to them), that they find it feasible to remain in the network even
when compliance to the norm is low (and thus are sufficiently deterred by the exclusion
mechanism). This only affects significantly infra-marginal firms, however; that is, the
firms that benefit most from the network or find it least costly to follow the norms. Most
other firms find the spontaneous network regulator to be ineffective, as described below.
These firms seek the least costly alternative regulator. In some cases, this would be a
non-network regulator, such as government regulation or bilateral contracts. But in many
circumstances, networks are more efficient regulators. In such cases, most firms will seek
another network that somehow avoids the paradox of spontaneous formation.
This quest for the least-cost regulator, in the face of the paradox that plagues
spontaneous private legal systems, results in a pattern of non-spontaneous evolution—the
assumption of responsibility for regulating behavior by networks that hitherto had
provided other, non-regulatory functions. I will elaborate on what is non-spontaneous
evolution of private legal systems later in this section. Then, in Section IV, this theory
will be applied in practice: a review of the some of the more notable work on private
ordering will point to documented cases of non-spontaneous evolution.
B. The Limits of Decentralized Bonds
The careful reader may question the speed with which the paper has disposed with
spontaneous formation of private legal systems. At the heart of the paradox that impedes
spontaneous formation is a problem of assurance—if most network members were
assured of the network’s ability to enforce a norm, they would follow that norm, and by
that action enable the network to enforce the norm on the few strays that violate it.
Assurance problems are hardly a novelty to the veteran institutional economist, and are in
fact the reason regulation (whether public or private) is needed. Almost any transaction in
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which the exchange is non-simultaneous would require the party obligated to act later in
time, to assure the other party that it will not renege on this obligation after reaping the
benefits it acquires from the transaction.
For example, Jack owns gold bullion; Jill is a famed goldsmith. Jack may hire Jill
to create exquisite jewelry from his gold bullion. Under the terms of the transaction, Jack
will deliver his gold bullion to Jill, who will then melt it and fashion it into jewelry. She
will then deliver the jewelry to Jack, who after inspecting the quality of the work will pay
Jill her fee.
The need for mutual assurance should be obvious. Once Jack parts with his gold,
Jill may renege on her promise and keep the gold. Jill is also vulnerable—after she has
expended time and effort to create the jewelry, Jack may take it and refuse to pay her.
One way of creating mutual assurance is through the public legal system (i.e., the
law). Contract law exists for this very purpose—to allow each party to an enforceable
agreement use of the enforcement machinery of the state to force the other party to
undertake the obligation (or better yet, to deter from reneging on it). In some cases,
criminal law intervenes, replacing private detection of violations (e.g., in contract law),
with complete government control over both detection and enforcement. But using the
public legal system to assure users of a network of its ability to enforce norms is often
questionable: if the network is not as good a regulator as the public legal system, why not
do away with the network and have the law regulate directly, rather than support a less
efficient regulator (the network). And if the network is more efficient than the public
legal system, the use of the public legal system to support the network would usually
introduce the costs and inefficiencies of the public legal system, which the network was
supposed to replace.
Private legal systems strive, just like their public counterpart, to provide assurance
to transacting parties. A key bilateral method of providing assurance is by posting
“bonds”.39 Bonds are interests of the assuring party40 that are placed at the mercy of the
assured party. Upon receiving a bond, the assured party may confiscate or destroy it at
39

See Oliver E. Williamson, Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange, 73 Am. Econ.
Rev. 519 (1983).
40
Such as property, right, reputation or other matter the destruction or confiscation of which affects the
assuring party’s utility.
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will, causing harm to the assuring party. Knowing that the assured party will use this
power if the assuring party reneged on an obligation, the assuring party will not renege.
This provides the assured party with peace of mind. But who will assure the assuring
party? If a bond can be confiscated at will (rather than only upon default of the assuring
party), then the assured party can confiscate the bond despite proper execution of the
underlying obligation. To mitigate this risk (and to guarantee the reciprocal obligation in
case of a transaction involving obligations from both parties), bonds can be exchanged.
This practice has been termed an “exchange of hostages”,41 and in fact, a literal
exchange of hostages has been among the early forms in which this mechanism was used
to assure commitment to peace treaties. Gregory of Tours describes the use of this
mechanism in the year 511: “But Theoderic and Childebert entered into a treaty and each
took an oath that neither would wage war upon the other. They took hostages so that they
might the more firmly adhere to what they had promised. Many sons of senatorial
families were thus given…”42
The object of the bond need not be loved ones, property, or anything tangible at
all. It may be something as intangible as reputation. Indeed, reputation is in its nature a
bond—an asset that affects the owner’s utility (by influencing the owner’s future
transactions with others), and can be affected by others (both positively and negatively).
Unsurprisingly, the private ordering literature has addressed reputation bonds
extensively. Lisa Bernstein describes their development and function among diamond
traders.43 Avner Greif and Karen Clay study their effect in merchant coalitions.44 Robert
Ellickson examines their impact on reducing disputes among neighbors over cattle
trespass incidents.45
Reputation bonds, however, are not a very useful tool for spontaneous networks.
For these networks, like the warlords in the earlier discussion of Pax Dei,46 one failed
41

Williamson, supra note 39, at 519, citing Thomas C. Schelling, An Essay on Bargaining, 46 Am. Econ.
Rev. 281, 300 (1956), at footnote 17 of the cited paper.
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Gregory of Tours, Enslaving Noble Families, in Patrologiae Cursus Completus (Paris, 1849, J. P. Migne,
ed.), Vol. LXXI, p. 255; reprinted in Roy C. Cave & Herbert H. Coulson, A Source Book for Medieval
Economic History (Milwaukee: The Bruce Publishing Co., 1936; reprint ed., New York: Biblo & Tannen,
1965), pp. 288-289; available at: http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/source/511Noblslav.html.
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Bernstein, supra note 6, at pp. 138-143, 145-148.
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Clay, supra note 6, at pp. 207-216 and Greif, supra note 6, at pp. 528-531, 535-542.
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Ellickson, supra note 9, at pp. 676-682.
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See supra, Section I.
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episode would lead to elimination, and hence network members discount future
interactions with the network (and its members). As discussed in the next subsection,
reputation might still be an effective bond if the network members interact with each
other outside the network (e.g., are members of the same social circle), or if the network
provides other functions that will survive its failure to regulate behavior. But absent
either of these, members will not value the establishment of a good reputation in a
network that is expected to fail.
Bonding, whether using tangible or intangible collateral, is an expensive
assurance system, and usually a crude one. Non-reciprocal bonding (providing a bond
without receiving one) leaves the party offering the bond vulnerable to the other party’s
ability to confiscate the bond without cause. Reciprocal bonding is subject to reciprocal
confiscation, which may leave both parties worse off, but not enough to deter an
opportunist. For example, if Jack and Jill, wanting to bond each other into performing
their contract,47 each give the other cash valued at $100 as collateral, Jill might refuse to
return Jack’s gold bullion. When Jack retaliates by confiscating Jill’s collateral, Jill can
confiscate Jack’s collateral, so that the bonds will set off each other without a deterring
effect.
Some bonds do not offset each other, because they harm one party while not
providing the other party with any utility. The hostage exchange between Theoderic and
Childebert is one such example—killing a hostage harms his or her kin, but does not
provide direct benefit to the murderer. Even with such collateral, there is a risk of
insufficient deterrence.
First, destroying collateral upon suffering a perceived offense might be rational
even when the destruction of the collateral it is not profitable, because it maintains
deterrence—it indicates that the same action may be taken again in the future if that
person is offended again. Indeed, as Richard Posner explains, this is the rational basis to
the concept of revenge.48 But the same mechanism that provides assurance also risks
preempting the destruction of the bond. Each party has an incentive to be very sensitive,
and react to the most minor slights, in order to deter the other parties from attempting
47

See the example of the contract between Jack the owner of gold bullion and Jill the goldsmith, earlier in
this subsection.
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Richard A. Posner, Law & Literature (Harvard University Press 2000) 49-60.

The Paradox of Spontaneous Formation of Private Legal Systems/Amitai Aviram

18

even minor opportunistic behavior at their expense.49 As a result, if there are sufficient
repeat transactions between parties, each party will overreact, by confiscating the bond, at
the first perception of an offense (in the hope of greater deterrence of the other party in
future transactions). But once a bond is confiscated, the other party may do the same,
eliminating the assurance mechanism and increasing the likelihood of a cycle of
opportunistic (or outright malicious) behavior.50
Second, even when exaggerated sensitivity can be avoided, the value of the
collateral is hard to determine. There is a cost to providing collateral, even when it is not
confiscated (e.g., a work of art given as collateral does not bring joy to its owner while it
is held by others).51 This cost creates an incentive to reduce the size of the collateral as
much as possible. On the other hand, collateral only deters from opportunism that is no
more profitable than the collateral’s value (otherwise, its owner would find it profitable to
commit the opportunistic act, pocket the gain and accept the loss of the collateral). Since
gains from opportunistic behavior vary widely, it is hard to anticipate the optimal value
of the collateral, and almost any level would fail to deter some, extremely profitable
opportunistic behavior. Furthermore, since parties exchanging bonds differ in their
perceived vulnerability to the other party’s opportunism and in their loss of utility from
providing the bond, they might disagree on the optimal value of the bond.
Bonds are limited in their ability to deter opportunism. Greif, Milgrom and
Weingast offer a formal game theory model that proves that bilateral bonds (such as
bilateral reputation mechanisms) do not deter opportunistic behavior when transactions
are at what would have been the efficient level absent the threat of opportunism. Their
model assumes a city, which may or may not protect the property and safety of merchants
doing business in it (failing to do so saves the city the cost of providing protection, and
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Id., at pp. 52-54.
The example above of the hostage exchange between Theoderic and Childebert may have failed for this
reason. As Gregory of Tours describes: “…but when a new quarrel broke out between the kings they [the
hostages—A.A.] were reduced to servitude… And those who had taken care of them now made slaves of
them…”. Gregory of Tours, supra note 42, id. It is noteworthy that the warring parties made slaves of the
hostages rather than kill them. This may be a rational action intended to inflict some harm on the
“collateral” (enslaving the hostages), while maintaining future deterrence through the ability to inflict
additional harm (by killing the hostages). Another rational explanation for this action may be that by
enslaving the hostages, each of the kings gained some benefit from “confiscating the collateral” (the value
of the slave labor). Killing the hostages would have brought them no direct utility.
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provides the city a gain from property confiscated from the merchants). The merchants in
this model consider their past experience with the city, and may boycott it and do their
business elsewhere if the city has failed to protect them in the past. The merchants in this
model are not able, however, to coordinate their responses. Greif, Milgrom and Weingast
demonstrate that when trade is at an optimal level, the future stream of income to the city
from the individual marginal merchant is almost zero, and therefore smaller than the
value of the goods confiscated or the cost of the protection services that can be
withheld.52 Thus, absent coordination, bonding is insufficient to deter opportunism when
the transacting level is optimal.
Greif, Milgrom and Weingast also demonstrate, that when coordination (and
enforcement of it) is feasible, merchants may be able to deter the city’s opportunistic
behavior, because the income lost from harming the marginal merchant is not only rents
accruing from that merchant’s future dealings, but from those of all coordinated
merchants.53 Applying this to the inquiry, it is possible that coordinated (centralized)
bonding can assure members of a network, which has just begun to regulate behavior, to
a degree sufficient to escape the paradox of spontaneous formation.
Since individuals seek the least-cost regulator, it is expected that in situations in
which network-based regulation is more efficient than other forms of regulation (e.g.,
government intervention or bilateral contracting), networks will evolve in a manner that
ultimately overcomes the paradox of spontaneous formation, by developing from
preexisting coordinated bonding mechanisms. This is the non-spontaneous evolution the
paper is set to explore.
C. The Role of Existing Functionality in the Evolution of Private Legal Systems
Centralized bonding mechanisms are almost invariably network-based. By having
the ability to coordinate a response to a party’s opportunism (and thus deterring
opportunism), the centralized coordinator is providing a benefit to its members. This
benefit is characterized by network effects—the more individuals’ responses are
coordinated, the greater the deterrence of would-be opportunists. Thus, the addition of
52
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another member to the centralized bonding mechanism increases the utility of each
existing member—precisely the definition of a network effect.54
The evolutionary process that results in a private legal system has two stages.
First, a network creating a centralized bonding mechanism would form (most likely, not
as an end of its own, but as a side effect of some other function the network serves).
Then, at stage two, the network would undertake regulating behavior, using its
enforcement ability.55 The most ubiquitous example of a network that facilitates
centralized bonding is a social network. Social networks use reputation bonds. I argued
earlier that reputation bonds are ineffective when individuals expect the network to fail.
Many social networks, however, continue to exist over long periods of time—one’s
neighbors, for example, will continue to affect one’s social life indefinitely (this
subsection will explain, below, why social networks may spontaneously form, while
regulating networks tend to fail if they form spontaneously). By gossiping about each
other within the social network, and by reacting to the gossip according to common
norms, the social network can align most members’ responses to any member’s deviant
behavior. When members of the same social circle are also part of another network that
attempts to regulate behavior, they will care for their reputations, for while the regulating
network cannot in itself harm them, the negative reputation they build will carry on to the
social network, and there the centralized bonding mechanism will punish them. There is
no need for two separate networks, however—one to regulate and the other to punish
deviance. If there is demand for certain regulation and networks are the efficient
providers, existing networks that enable centralized bonding—such as social networks,
religious groups, etc.—will evolve to provide the required regulation.
Looking again at the Pax Dei movement, one may now understand better what
made the warlords abide to the imposed constraints on warfare. The religious network
provided each member, including the warlords, with fulfillment of spiritual needs, a sense
54

The investment each member of a network makes in a network is in itself a bond, that expulsion from the
network will confiscate. See Rachel E. Kranton, The Formation of Cooperative Relationships, 12 J. of L.
Econ. & Org. 214 (1996).
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Admittedly, the difference between regulation and non-regulatory functions of a network is murky at
times. The correct differentiation is, for reasons explained later in this subsection, the underlying “game
type” of each function. However, regulation of behavior tends to involve some of the more expensive to
enforce game types, such as Prisoners’ Dilemma and Stag Hunt. This is why regulation of behavior is often
undertaken only in a later stage of the evolution of the network.
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of security and well being derived from belonging to a community. Coordination was
achieved both through formal means (religious leaders such as bishops) and informal
means (norms and beliefs deep-rooted in the members of the community). Then, when a
need to restrict warfare arose, the religious network was the least-cost regulator and
quickly evolved to accommodate this need. The community was driven to act in uniform
hostility to breaches of the peace because their formal coordinators—bishops and keepers
of saints’ relics—told them to do so, and because norms viewing certain forms of
violence as “unchristian” could easily take shape. Once the religious network evolved to
undertake not just spiritual salvation but also regulation of warfare, the warlords were
threatened by their religious network with ostracism (which would deny them the
spiritual and social benefits provided by the religious network), and possibly faced a
coordinated violent response from the members of the religious network. This
enforcement power, that existed before the network undertook the regulation of warfare,
was effective, for a time, in restricting the warlords’ belligerence.
But how do social or religious networks overcome the paradox of spontaneous
formation, and create a centralized bonding mechanism? After all, for the centralized
bonding mechanism to succeed, the network usually needs an ability to enforce on its
members uniform adherence to its decisions. For example, in 1284 a German trading ship
was attacked and pillaged by Norwegians. The German merchants responded by
prohibiting the sale of grain, flour, vegetables and beer to Norway. To enforce the
embargo, the German towns posted ships in the Danish Straits. Ultimately, according to
the chronicler Detmar, “there broke out a famine so great that [the Norweigians] were
forced to make atonement”.56 The network of German merchants succeeded. But how did
they manage to acquire stable enforcement abilities, despite the theory that has been
elaborated for much of this section of the paper?
The reason that some functions (e.g., social or religious interaction) can be
facilitated by spontaneously formed self-enforcing networks, while other functions (e.g.,
restricting warfare) are only availed when a preexisting network evolves to encompass
that function as well, lies in enforcement costs. People migrate to the lowest-cost
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regulator (holding regulation quality constant). Thus, less costly enforcement
mechanisms are likely to survive, while higher cost counterparts are likely to fail, even if
their benefits outweigh the enforcement costs (because the same benefits would be
achieved by a less costly regulator).
The high-enforcement cost functions do not remain unregulated for long,
however, since low enforcement cost networks expand to encompass them.57 Once a
network provides a function that has low enforcement costs, the (less costly) enforcement
mechanisms it has developed are able to enforce more costly functions, bypassing the
spontaneous formation paradox.58 Thus, the network evolves to accommodate the new
function.59
For example, reconsider the (lower enforcement cost) function of providing social
and spiritual services and the (higher enforcement cost) function of restricting warfare.
The social/religious network, due to its low enforcement costs, is likely to survive and
provide its members with a sense of community, social interaction, and spiritual
guidance; this, in turn, will strengthen its enforcement mechanisms (for example, it will
increase the harm it can inflict on a member by excluding her from the network). In
contrast, a spontaneously formed network attempting to restrict warfare is likely to fail
due to the difficulty its fledgling enforcement mechanisms will have in overcoming the
high enforcement costs. This failure—the paradox of spontaneous formation—will occur
even if the benefits of restricting warfare outweigh the costs of enforcing it. The reason
for failure is not necessarily the infeasibility of enforcing restrictions on warfare, but the
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This is true, of course, only if enforcement costs do not outweigh the benefits of enforcement. But as was
demonstrated above, infra Section II.1, spontaneously formed networks will fail to enforce functions with
high-enforcement costs even when those costs are lower than the benefits internalized by all members
together, because of the spontaneous formation paradox. This is where other, preexisting networks may
evolve to enforce the high-cost, yet welfare-enhancing function.
58
Of course, a network can only expand to enforce another function if its existing enforcement mechanisms
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example, a social network in a certain town can perhaps assume a new function of enforcing peace among
the members of that town. But it cannot enforce peace between members of other towns, since the
enforcement mechanisms of that network can only be employed against network members, and enforcing
peace in other towns requires influencing non-members (the villagers of the other towns).
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Since it is the least costly enforcer that will likely become the regulator, two additional conditions must
be satisfied in order for a network providing a certain function to evolve into enforcing a function with
more costly enforcement: (1) a network is the lowest cost regulator of this function (as opposed to
government intervention or bilateral contracting, for example); and (2) the network has lower costs of
enforcement than any other network governing the same group of members.
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lack of spontaneously formed enforcement mechanisms to overcome the collective action
problem.
Since the barrier to regulating warfare lies not in infeasibility of doing so, but in
an absence of a spontaneously formed enforcement mechanism, it would be beneficial for
the social/religious network to utilize its enforcement mechanisms to regulate warfare.
Initially, it can threaten to withhold from non-complying members their benefit from the
religious and social functions of the network. Then, after this threat causes members to
comply and peace ensues, the network’s enforcement mechanisms become even stronger,
as expulsion from the network results not only in a loss of social and spiritual benefits,
but in exclusion from the benefits of the restraints on warfare (i.e., members are not
restricted when waging war on the excluded party). The expanded network, now wielding
more powerful enforcement mechanisms, may now evolve to encompass even more
costly (yet beneficial) functions.60
To recap, the conditions that a network needs to satisfy in order to expand into
regulation of another, higher-cost function are: (1) the network’s original function needs
to have sufficiently low costs of enforcement to form spontaneously and survive (i.e.,
succeed in enforcing the low cost function); (2) the benefits to be internalized by network
members from the newly assumed function outweigh the costs of enforcing the function,
yet the enforcement costs are sufficiently high to prevent spontaneous formation of a
60

Implicit support for the above expectation (that every successful step in the evolution of a private legal
system strengthens its enforcement mechanisms and may enable it to then attempt to regulate even more
expensive functions) is found in the paper by Grief, Milgrom and Weingast. They note that the
monopolistic rents that medieval merchant guilds accrued for their members assisted in the disciplining
these members (since expulsion from the guild would cause a merchant to lose those rents. See Greif,
Milgrom & Weingast, supra note 9, at p. 749: “This type of monopoly rights generated a stream of rents
that depended on the support of other members and served as a bond, allowing members to commit
themselves to collective action in response to a ruler’s transgressions”, and at p. 757-758: “These guilds,
therefore, were able to provide their members with streams of rents in their hometowns. Receiving these
rents, however, could have been made conditional on following the recommendations, rules, and directives
of the guild. Hence these rents could serve to tie a member to the guild by making change of residence
costly and to ensure solidarity among the guild’s members.” But this is a static view of the private legal
system. At the time that the social network of merchants in the town had evolved to police a cartel within
the town, and thus secure these monopoly rents, it could use the rents to enhance the power of the exclusion
mechanism and evolve the network yet again, this time into regulating merchants’ activities abroad. To
acquire the monopolistic position in the first place, the guild had to first evolve from lowest-cost functions
(providing social interaction and information), to moderate-cost functions (maintaining a market within
town), to relatively high-cost functions (maintaining a cartel within town). After each step of this evolution,
the network’s enforcement mechanisms increased in power by adding the new benefits to the utility
provided the network provides, and can take away. This increase power then enables the network to evolve
to even more expensive to enforce functions.
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network enforcing only this function; (3) enforcement of the new, higher-cost function is
possible through disciplining the existing members of the network; (4) the network has
lower costs of enforcement than any other network satisfying the previous three
conditions; (5) a network is the lowest cost regulator (as opposed to government
intervention or bilateral contracting, for example) of the newly assumed function.
The key to identifying the network that will evolve to regulate other functions is,
therefore, enforcement costs. Not all functions have equal enforcement costs. It is easier
to get people to socially interact with their neighbors then to get them to keep their
contractual obligations to the same neighbors. Social interaction benefits most people
more than isolation, and most people would rather interact with some people even if
others in the same group snub them. So there are few costs involved in getting people to
cooperate in agreeing to interrelate. On the other hand, one would like everyone to
commit to their promises, but if some people did not, one is unlikely to commit, fearful of
being taken advantage of by others. In some cases, one would not commit even knowing
that everyone else is committing, in the hope of taking advantage of the others. In either
of these cases, some enforcement costs are necessary to secure members’ commitment to
promises they had made. This paper will refer to the set of relative preferences of people
involved in a given function as the “game type” of that function.61 The effects of game
types on enforcement costs will be addressed in depth later in this subsection and in later
sections.
Other factors also affect enforcement costs. For example, it is easier to enforce a
norm (or provide another function) when the costs and benefits of the enforcement of a
norm are similar for each of the constituents. The greater the divergence between the
interests each of the individuals, the more expensive it is to secure adherence to the
norms (or to even formulate them). For example, assume a society of people of equal
health, but widely differing wealth. It would be relatively easy to enforce a norm
mandating that people infected with dangerous contagious diseases should be
quarantined. Each person, whether rich or poor, is (roughly) equally vulnerable to
diseases, and thus everyone benefits equally from the norm. Each person is also subject to
61

There are four possibilities among which the relative preferences are considered: cooperating when
others cooperate, cooperating when others do not cooperate, not cooperating when others cooperate, and
not cooperating when others do not cooperate.
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a (roughly) equal probability of being infected by the dangerous disease and thus bearing
the cost of the norm—isolation until recovery. The probability and severity of harm from
the imposition of the norm is also distributed in a roughly equal manner.
Contrast this with the formation of a norm about tax structure (e.g., progressive
vs. regressive taxation; estate taxes, etc.). In this case, benefits from the tax are
presumably distributed equally, but the burden of it would shift significantly depending
on the tax structure. If the tax is progressive, people with higher income will pay a larger
percentage of their income than poorer people; similarly, estate taxes place widely
varying burdens depending on accumulated wealth. Disagreement, and with it
enforcement costs, are expected to be greater for the latter norm (taxes) than the former
norm (medical quarantine).
Not only the variance of costs and benefits of the function affects enforcement
costs; so does the average net benefit. A network’s use of the exclusion, information or
control mechanisms is more effective the greater the utility a member receives from the
network. Thus, the enforcement ability of a religious network is likely to be less powerful
among a group of secular people than among devoutly religious people, since the latter
derive more utility from the spiritual benefits they receive.
Market structure (both in the network segment and in the individuals segment) is
yet another criterion affecting enforcement costs. A network that provides significantly
more utility to its members than could its rivals is likely to have lower enforcement costs
than a network that has to compete with rival networks that can offer members as much
(or more) utility. Competition among networks depends not only on the number of
alternative competitors, but on switching costs between networks and on the number of
networks that provide comparable benefits. Where network effects are significant
compared to other elements of the network’s utility,62 similarity in the transacting volume
or membership of networks indicates the provision of comparable utility.
To illustrate the relationship between competition and enforcement costs, consider
a sparsely populated, rural area that likely has a single social circle (or several circles
interacting sufficiently to form a single network). A more densely populated urban area,
62

On the differentiation between the intrinsic value of a network good and the network value of the same
good see Robert Ahdieh, Making Markets: Network Effects and the Role of Law in the Creation and
Restructuring of Securities Markets, 76 S. Cal. L. Rev. 277 (2003).
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in contrast, might accommodate several different social networks with little
interconnection among them. Enforcement mechanisms would be more effective in the
single rural network than in any of the urban networks, which a rogue member can
abandon in favor of another social network at low cost.63
This list of factors affecting enforcement costs is not exhaustive. A reader familiar
with antitrust scholarship may notice the similarity between these criteria and the criteria
that facilitate collusion among firms.64 This is no coincidence, as cartels are a form of
behavior regulation—firms are disciplined to maintain their prices and outputs at a level
maximizing the collective’s profits.65 The key hazard to a cartel is an inability to enforce
its mandates—the same enforcement problem that other, socially beneficial private legal
systems face.
The literature on cartel stability is not immediately applicable to the analysis of
private legal systems at large, however, since it does not discuss an important element
described above—the game type of the function. This is not due to short-sightedness on
the part of the scholars in this area, but rather due to a common trait of cartels: the
function of policing cartels is nearly always of the Prisoners’ Dilemma game type. Each
cartel member has the following rank of preferences: (1) she does not abide by cartel
rules but other members do (thus increasing her profits above the cartel level by
undercutting the cartel); (2) she abides by cartel rules and so do the other members (thus
she gains cartel level profits); (3) she does not abide to the cartel rules and neither do the
other members (thus she receives competitive market profits); and finally (4) she abides
by cartel rules but other members do not (thus she receives zero profits, since everyone
undercuts her higher, cartel-level price).

63

This is not to say that less competition among networks is net welfare enhancing. While a reduction in
competition increases the network’s ability to regulate (which is welfare-enhancing), it also decreases the
network’s incentive to regulate efficiently, as the network may regulate in a manner that enhances or
maintains its market power rather than in a manner that reduces opportunism. Whether the increased ability
to regulate outweighs the reduced incentive to regulate or vice versa depends on particular circumstances.
On differentiating between networks’ ability to regulate and networks’ incentive to regulate see Aviram,
supra note 11, at Sections III.3 and III.4.
64
See Stigler, supra note 14; Dick, supra note 14.
65
Of course, this level is typically not optimal to a single firm assuming that other firms abide by the cartel
rules. It is also not optimal from the perspective of all of society (consumers and producers together), since
the utility loss by consumers is greater than the utility gain by all producers.
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If pricing at cartel level is considered cooperating and undercutting prices is
considered defaulting, then the above set of preferences can be summarized as:
{D,C}>{C,C}>{D,D}>{C,D}. The same set of preferences is true for each member of
the cartel. As will be explained below,66 this set of preferences is characteristic of the
Prisoners’ Dilemma game.
Thus, as mentioned above, since (almost) all cartels are Prisoners’ Dilemma
games, the literature examining cartel stability is not concerned with the underlying game
type. When considering, however, the broader range of functions that a network can
regulate, one finds a richer variety of game types. As explained above, the difference in
game types matters—a Prisoner’s Dilemma game requires more costly enforcement than,
say, a game of Meeting Place. This will make functions that are of the Meeting Place type
to be more likely to survive spontaneous formation, while functions that are of a
Prisoners’ Dilemma type are less likely to do so. Networks enforcing a Meeting Place
type of function may, in time, evolve to enforce the Prisoners’ Dilemma type functions.
A reverse direction of evolution (from the Prisoners’ Dilemma type function to the
Meeting Place type function) is much less likely.
Given the importance of the function’s game type, and the dearth of attention to it
in current literature on factors affecting cartels’ (and private legal systems’) stability, this
paper will examine game types in depth in the following section.
III. A Taxonomy of Game Types
This section will describe a few key game types that characterize functions that
are commonly regulated by networks.67 The list is far from exhaustive—games can be
refined infinitely, to suit the unique payoff characteristics of any form of interaction.68
Since this is an initial exploration of the effect of a function’s game type on the ability of

66

Infra, Section III.7.
On game theory generally, see, e.g., Douglas G. Baird, Robert H. Gertner & Randal C. Picker, Game
Theory and the Law (Harvard, 1994); John Eatwell, Murray Milgate & Peter Newman (eds.), Game Theory
(Norton, 1987).
68
Even generic games that correctly portray incentives may be mere parts of a larger game, with different
incentive structures. See Baird, Gertner & Picker, id., at p. 45: “One must also guard against looking at
interactions between players in isolation. A problem that may look like a prisoner’s dilemma or some other
simple two-by-two game may be part of a much larger game. Once cannot assume that, once embedded in a
larger game, the play of the smaller game will be the same.”
67
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a network to regulate the function, this section will examine a handful of arch-types that
broadly describe most functions, rather than identify exact game types that fit a specific
function, in a specific setting (e.g., a specific group, region, time, etc.).
A game type is an abstraction of the incentives of people involved in a given
interaction (in this paper’s context, a function administered by a network). The
abstraction is made by determining a ‘payoff’ to each player (i.e., benefit conferred on
the player) based on both what that player did, and what others interacting with that
player do. The payoff is measured in “utils”, a generic scale measuring benefits of any
kind conferred on a player (e.g., money, other material benefits, spiritual elation, a sense
of being loved, etc.). There might be a different payoff to the player for each combination
of her and others’ actions; mirroring real life, the choice a player makes affects her
welfare, but so do the choices others make.
To reduce complication, several abstractions will be made in the games examined
in this paper. First, it is assumed there are two players—a network member and the other
network members (or a network member and the network governance institution).
Second, each player is limited a choice between two actions. These actions will change
from game to game depending on the illustrative story of the game, but generally they
will be called ‘Cooperate’ ({C}) and ‘Default’ ({D}).69
To clarify the concept of a game type, consider the ‘function’ of providing a
venue for scorn: Statler and Waldorf, the grumpy old men sitting on the balcony in “The
Muppets’ Show”, love to express derision at anything and everything. When the Muppets
Show is not on and they find no targets for their venom on stage, they must verbally
attack each other. The best that can possibly happen from Statler’s point of view is when
he says something nasty to Waldorf, and Waldorf does not reply. Second to this
“oneupsmanship” is a situation in which they exchange gibes. Much less satisfying is a

69

To make the illustrative examples more intuitive, this paper will sometimes call the more socially
beneficial of the two actions “cooperating”, while the other, less virtuous action will be called “defaulting”.
But this is not always the case. There does not have to be anything morally or socially better in an action
called “cooperating” over an action called “defaulting”. In some games, the two options would be
equivalent morally and from a welfare-maximizing perspective. For example, in the Battle of the Sexes
game, described supra, in Section III.3, the “cooperating” action is going to see a baseball game, while the
“defaulting” action is going to see a movie. The tags of cooperation and default are used merely to make
this game comparable to other games discussed in this section, and not to denote a positive or negative
connotation to either action.
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situation in which both Statler and Waldorf are nice to each other, and their venom fails
to find an outlet. Bad as that sounds, it can get worse—Statler might act nicely to
Waldorf, who in return will mock Statler with a nasty jeer; suffering an unanswered jab is
even worse than having everyone play nice.70
Waldorf has the same preferences as Statler (reversing the roles, of course).
Abstracting these preferences into a table, the payoff structure will look like this:71

Waldorf acts nicely

Waldorf mocks

Statler acts nicely

1,1

0,3

Statler mocks

3,0

2,2

Placing the payoff information in a table helps us identify the likely outcome.
Let’s put ourselves in Statler’s shoes. If he expects Waldorf to act nicely, Statler is better
off mocking him (he will then get 3 “utils” (southwest box) instead of one util (northwest
box)). And if Statler expects Waldorf to mock him, Statler will—once again, mock
Waldorf (he will get 2 utils (southeast box) rather than zero utils (northeast box)). So
Statler will mock Waldorf regardless of what he expects Waldorf to do. Since Waldorf
has the same preferences, he will reach the same conclusion, and the two will end up
teasing and insulting each other. That’s good news—this happens to be the welfaremaximizing solution, since they get two utils each, or 4 total—a larger total than in any of
the other boxes.
This game is known as the “Deadlock” game, because if acting nicely were
considered to be “cooperating”, the parties would be deadlocked in refusal to cooperate.72
The Deadlock game is among the most costly to enforce mutual cooperation—not
only do the parties tend to not cooperate, but the welfare maximizing situation for them is
70

To summarize, the set of preferences for each player of the Deadlock game is:
{D,C}>{D,D}>{C,C}>{C,D}.
71
For the payoff set in each box, Statler’s payoff is noted first, then Waldorf’s payoff.
72
A commonly cited real world example of this game would be arms control negotiations between two
countries who do not want to disarm (i.e., would prefer that both they and their enemy be armed than both
they and their enemy be unarmed). The likely result is a failure of the arms control negotiations. See, e.g.,
Janet Chen, Su-I Lu & Dan Vekhter, Game Theory—Non Zero Sum Games—Other Games, available at:
http://cse.stanford.edu/classes/sophomore-college/projects-98/game-theory/dilemma.html.
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mutual default, so if they could coordinate, they’d attempt to enforce mutual default
rather than mutual cooperation. Imagine, for example, Statler & Waldorf’s response if
Kermit tried to force them to act kindly to each other…73
The following subsections will examine other games, their illustrative stories,
their payoff structure, the likely behavior of the players and the relative ease of enforcing
cooperation in them.
A. Harmony
The Harmony game can be seen to be an inverse of the Deadlock game.74 It is the
easiest game in which to enforce mutual cooperation. In fact, no enforcement at all is
necessary. Alice and Bill, two very good friends, face a choice between the same two
actions that Statler and Waldorf chose from in the Deadlock game: they can act nicely to
the other or they could mock him/her. Unlike Statler and Waldorf, each of them prefers to
be nice to the other, even if he himself is slighted by the other (after all, the other’s slight
may have been merely a misperception, and at any rate, they care for each other so much
that hurting the other would indirectly hurt them). Next worst possibility is that they
themselves somehow failed and mocked the other. In that case, each hopes that the other
would show restraint and not mock back (this would be worse than being mocked while
acting nicely, since the shame of being rude to one’s friend in the former case outweighs
the anger at being mocked in the latter case). The worst for these two would be slipping
into mutual taunting.75 Putting these preferences into a payoff table yields this:76

Bill acts nicely

73

Bill mocks

Alice acts nicely

3,3

2,1

Alice mocks

1,2

0,0

Fortunately, absent externalities on non-players, mutual defection is the optimal equilibrium for a
deadlock game, so enforcing cooperation may not be beneficial. If the goal of enforcement is not to achieve
mutual cooperation, but to achieve maximum joint social welfare, then the deadlock game is very
inexpensive to enforce—it will result in mutual default without any enforcement.
74
On the Harmony game see, e.g., Amir N. Licht, Games Commissions Play: 2x2 Games of International
Securities Regulation, 24 Yale J. Int’l L. 61, 108-111 (1999).
75
The set of preferences for each player of the Harmony game is: {C,C}>{C,D}>{D,C}>{D,D}.
76
In each box, Alice’s payoff is noted first, then Bill’s payoff.
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If Alice anticipates that Bill will act nicely, she will certainly reciprocate (she would get 3
utils in that case, rather than 1 if she mocked him). If Alice anticipates that Bill will mock
her, she will still act nicely (as she would get two points for being nice despite Bill’s
behavior, while she would get zero points if she mocked back). So, Alice will always act
nicely towards Bill. Since Bill has the same preferences, he will always act nicely
towards Alice. There is therefore only one Nash equilibrium77 in this game: mutual
cooperation. This means that no enforcement is needed to achieve mutual cooperation.
B. Meeting Place
Meeting Place is the second least expensive game to enforce mutual cooperation
(after the Harmony game). Alice and Bill—still very good friends—can either wait at the
lobby of the law school, or at the library. Since they enjoy each others’ company, they
derive the most utility when they are both waiting in the same place—the meeting place.
They are indifferent as to whether the meeting place is the lobby or the library, as long as
they are both there. If they are not together, they are unhappy to the same degree, whether
Alice is waiting at the lobby and Bill at the library, or vice versa.78 To put the payoff
structure into a table:79

Bill at lobby

Bill at library

Alice at lobby

2,2

0,0

Alice at library

0,0

2,2

What will each of them do? If Alice thought Bill would go to the lobby, she
would too. If she thought Bill would go to the library, so would she. Bill would do the
same. Each of them may fail to anticipate where the other is going, and as a result they
77

A Nash equilibrium is a set of actions, one for each player, under which a player knowing what the other
players’ actions are could not improve her utility by picking another action. On Nash equilibrium, see: John
F. Nash, Jr., Equalibrium Points in n-person Games, 36 Proceedings of the Nat’l Academy of Sciences,
U.S.A. 48 (1950); John Nash, Non-Cooperative Games, 54 Annals of Mathematics 286 (1951); David M.
Kreps, Nash Equilibrium, in Eatwell, Milgate & Newman, supra note 67, pp. 167-177.
78
The set of preferences for each player of the Meeting Place game can be summarized as:
{C,C}={D,D}>{C,D}={D,C}.
79
In each box, Alice’s payoff is noted first, then Bill’s payoff.
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would be apart despite both of them wanting to be together. However, the cost of
enforcing cooperation is very low—all that is needed is to convey information from one
of them to the other as to where he or she will be (the meeting place, from which the
game’s name is derived).80 There is no need for bilateral communication or for
negotiating an agreement—once one knows of the other’s action, the other will adjust
behavior to ensure that they both meet.
C. Battle of the Sexes
Battle of the Sexes adds one important element to the Meeting Place game—each
player now has an opposing preference as to the location in which they will meet, but
they still prefer being together in the disfavored location over being alone in a favored
location. Alice and Bill, now wife and husband, make evening plans. As with the other
games, they are limited to two choices: either go to a baseball game (Alice’s favorite
pastime), or see a movie (Bill’s favorite activity).81 Loving couple that they are, each
prefers to do the activity they less favor but be together, rather than opt for the favorite
activity but be alone. Unlike the Meeting Place game, however, they are partial as to
where they’d prefer to spend time together (and their preferences conflict).82 Also,
excessive consideration on the part of both will lead to the worst of possible situations, in
which Alice goes to see a movie (to please Bill), while Bill goes to the baseball game (to
please Alice). The payoff table may be as follows:83

80

Quite often both parties will converge on the same location, even without coordination. See Thomas C.
Schelling, Bargaining, Communication and Limited War, 1 Conflict Resolution 19, 20-21 (1957)
(discussing, inter alia, an experiment in which people were told they are to meet someone in New York
City, though they do not have a prior understanding as to when and where the meeting will take place and
cannot communicate with that person prior to the meeting. Schelling reported that an absolute majority
picked Grand Central Station as the meeting place, and virtually all of them picked noon as the meeting
time).
81
In the original formulation of the illustrative example of this game, a husband wanted to watch a boxing
match while the wife wanted to watch a ballet performance. That example is attributed to R. Duncan Luce
and Howard Raiffa. See David Crump, Game Theory, Legislation, and the Multiple Meanings of Equality,
38 Harv. J. of Legis. 331, 367 (2001), at footnote 156.
82
If going to a baseball game is considered as action “C” while going to a movie is considered as action
“D”, then in a Battle of the Sexes game the set of preferences for Alice is: {C,C}>{D,D}>{C,D}>{D,C},
while Bill’s set of preferences is: {D,D}>{C,C}>{D,C}>{C,D}.
83
In each box, Alice’s payoff is noted first, then Bill’s payoff.
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Bill goes to a movie

Alice sees baseball game

3,2

0,0

Alice goes to a movie

1,1

2,3

Absent coordination, the players might find themselves sliding into the worse
outcome, and paradoxically this is more likely to happen the greater their mutual care for
each other. Consider O. Henry’s “The Gift of the Magi”, in which a loving but poor
couple seek to buy each other Christmas gifts.84 Jim sells his pocket watch to buy Della a
set of combs; Della sells her hair to a wig maker to buy Jim a gold chain for his pocket
watch.85
An enforcement mechanism is needed, therefore, to achieve the optimal outcome,
though it might suffice that this mechanism would convey to one party information on the
other party’s expected actions (e.g., notify Bill that Alice has decided to go see a baseball
game, in which case Bill will decided to do the same). Unlike the Meeting Place game,
however, each player prefers one plan over the other, so allocation of the surplus from
cooperating becomes an issue. If this is a repeated game (e.g., Alice and Bill have to
make decisions as to evening plans every day), they may act strategically to get the other
party to concede to meet at their preferred place. For example, Bill may go to the movies,
despite knowing that Alice is going to the baseball game, in order to signal to her that he
is interested that they would go together to the movies. He will suffer a loss in the short
term (since he prefers to be with Alice at the baseball stadium than alone at the cinema),
but his signal may facilitate long-term gains (by going more often together to the movies,
rather than going together to the baseball game).
The need to decide how to allocate the cooperative surplus and the likelihood of
strategic behavior on the part of either (or both) parties increase both the cost of
84

William S. Porter (O. Henry), The Gift of the Magi, in The Best Short Stories of O. Henry (Modern
Library, 1994) 1, available at: http://www.auburn.edu/~vestmon/Gift_of_the_Magi.html.
85
The Gift of the Magi might not be an ideal example of a failure in a Battle of the Sexes game, because O.
Henry states clearly in the end of the story that the mutual sacrifices are of great value. Id. While the gifts
were not useable, they did indicate strong affection and therefore provided utility to the players. In a true
Battle of the Sexes game, a player derives no utility from knowing the other player made a sacrifice (unless
that sacrifice causes the two to be together, in which case the utility would be from being together, not from
being the beneficiary of a sacrifice).

The Paradox of Spontaneous Formation of Private Legal Systems/Amitai Aviram

34

negotiating and reaching a plan on where they will go on each day, and a risk that either
party will renege on the agreement in order to renegotiate it in his or her favor. However,
given that the short-term interests of both parties lie in cooperating, enforcement costs are
still much lower than in game types in which the parties do not favor cooperation as a
goal of its own.
D. Stag Hunt
The Stag Hunt game is based on a passage from Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s
Discourse on the Origin and Basis of Inequality among Men, which was written in
1754.86 Rousseau discusses cooperation among hunters; to hunt deer (which could feed
all the participating hunters), each hunter has to stay at his post; if one hunter abandoned
his post, the deer could escape. However, continues Rousseau, if any one of the hunters
encounters a hare (which can be caught by a single hunter, but only barely provides food
for a single hunter), he will likely abandon his post and capture the hare. As a result of at
least one of the hunters abandoning the stag hunt in favor of catching a hare, the hunt for
the deer will fail.87 The payoffs for this game (with two hunters) look as follows:88

Hunter B ambushes deer

Hunter B chases hare

Hunter A ambushes deer

3,3

1,0

Hunter A chases hare

0,1

1,1

Why would a hunter abandon his post and opt for the hare when he can receive
more food if the stag hunt is successful? Capturing a hare is completely within the control
of the individual hunter; capturing the stag is not. If the hunter suspects one his fellows
86

Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Discourse on the Origin and Basis of Inequality Among Men (Second Discourse)
(Everyman’s Library, New York, 1950) 428, available at: http://www.constitution.org/jjr/ineq.htm: “In this
manner, men may have insensibly acquired some gross ideas of mutual undertakings, and of the advantages
of fulfilling them: that is, just so far as their present and apparent interest was concerned: for they were
perfect strangers to foresight, and were so far from troubling themselves about the distant future, that they
hardly thought of the morrow. If a deer was to be taken, every one saw that, in order to succeed, he must
abide faithfully by his post: but if a hare happened to come within the reach of any one of them, it is not to
be doubted that he pursued it without scruple, and, having seized his prey, cared very little, if by so doing
he caused his companions to miss theirs.”
87
The set of preferences for each player of the Stag Hunt game is: {C,C}>{D,C}≥{D,D}>{C,D}.
88
In each box, Hunter A’s payoff is noted first, then Hunter B’s payoff.
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will abandon his post, he too should do so, for the stag will escape (and the hunter will
remain with neither stag nor hare) if cooperation is not achieved.
The Stag Hunt is a relatively inexpensive game to enforce, though it is likely to be
more expensive to enforce than the two previously described games. Like Meeting Place
and Battle of the Sexes, it has two Nash equilibria.89 Unlike these two games, however,
one equilibrium results in greater welfare for both parties than the other, so unlike the
Meeting Place and Battle of the Sexes games, in which a person concerned only with
(joint) welfare-maximizing would be indifferent as to which of the two equilebria would
result,90 the players have a preference in the Stag Hunt for mutual cooperation. This
increases the value in ensuring mutual cooperation, but as a result requires expending
enforcement costs in order to reach one equilibrium rather than another. Enforcement
costs are not very high, however, since both players seek the same equilibrium and
therefore would not act strategically to deceive each other. However, each player would
need some assurance that the other player will not default.
E. Chicken
The Chicken game is a game of coordination, but not cooperation. Its illustrative
story is taken from the movie “Rebel without a Cause”.91 Jim Stark (actor James Dean)
and Buzz Gunderson compete for the heart of Judy by playing the “chicken-run” game.
They steal a couple of cars and simultaneously race them towards a cliff. The first driver
to jump out of the car is declared the “chicken”; the other driver can then jump out and be
considered the winner, gaining Judy’s affection and the respect of his peers. The cars run
off the cliff and plunge to the ground, killing a driver who failed to jump out in time.
The order of preferences for each driver is thus as follows: (1) Waiting for the
other driver to jump while the other driver “chickens-out” (i.e., jumps early), thus
winning the game; (2) chickening-out while the other driver does the same (no shame for
89

One Nash equilibrium is {Hunt Stag, Hunt Stag} (in generic terms—{C, C}), the other is {Chase Hare,
Chase Hare} (in generic terms {D, D}).
90
In the Meeting Place game, one would also be indifferent as to the allocative differences between the two
equilebria (because there are none—both players gain the same payoffs in either equilibrium). In the Battle
of the Sexes game, however, there are allocative differences (though not differences in total welfare)
between the equilibria—Alice is better off if she and Bill went to see a baseball game; Bill is better off if
they went to a movie.
91
Rebel Without a Cause (1955), directed by Nicholas Ray.
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either driver); (3) chickening-out while the other driver waits (a shameful loss); and worst
of all, (4) waiting while the other driver does the same, resulting in both drivers staying in
the car too long and plunging to their deaths.92 The payoff table is:93

Buzz chickens-out

Buzz waits

Jim chickens-out

2,2

1,3

Jim waits

3,1

0,0

Each player’s action is the inverse of his assessment of the other player’s action.
If Jim thinks Buzz will chicken-out, Jim would be wise to wait. If Jim thinks Buzz will
wait (i.e., not jump until Jim does), Jim should chicken-out so as not to die. When this
game is played repeatedly and reputation matters, each party will be wise to invest in
building a reputation of aggressiveness, to make clear to the other party that they will not
chicken-out (once this reputation is established, the other player would be rational to
chicken-out, and so the aggressive player will gain the most favorable outcome (winning
the Chicken game) in all future interactions.
Enforcing mutual cooperation (in the context of the Chicken game, mutually
“chickening-out”) is more expensive than in either Meeting Place, Battle of the Sexes or
Stag Hunt games, since the natural equilibrium for a player informed of the rival’s move
is never mutual cooperation.94 There is a demand from the players for a mechanism that
will convey the players’ intentions, and once one player credibly commits his actions to
the other player,95 they will both remain in an equilibrium. But this equilibrium will not
be mutual cooperation; to reach mutual cooperation, the players must be forced to
cooperate. Even once cooperation is achieved, it is not stable. Any success in causing the
players to cooperate (mutually chicken-out) will increase the incentive for both parties to
each take advantage of the other side’s cooperation (chickening out) to default (wait in
the car). The result would be continuous pressures to revert from mutual cooperation.

92

The set of preferences for each Chicken player is thus: {D,C}>{C,C}>{C,D}>{D,D}.
In each box, Jim’s payoff is noted first, then Buzz’s payoff.
94
Rather, the player will either chicken-out (cooperate) if the other player defaults, or default (wait in the
car) if the other player cooperates.
95
Credible commitment of aggressive intentions is costly in itself, and most likely both parties will expend
this cost in a competition to be deter the other party.
93
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F. Bully
The Bully game is a hybrid of the Chicken game and the Deadlock game. One
player has payoffs similar to those in a Chicken game, while the other has payoffs similar
to those in a Deadlock game. An example of this pattern is the biblical story of the trial
before King Solomon.96 Two women gave birth, but one of the babies died soon
thereafter. Both women claimed the living infant was theirs. Both women knew which of
them gave birth to the surviving child, but no evidence was available to prove this to third
parties. The women appealed to King Solomon for judgment. The king offered to cut the
baby and give each woman half of it. One woman agreed to this “compromise”, while the
other declined and stated she would rather have the baby given to her rival than have it
die. King Solomon then decreed that the latter woman is the real mother, and awarded the
baby to her.
King Solomon was quick to understand the Bully game underlying the case before
him.97 The real mother, knowing the baby was hers and therefore loving him was facing
Chicken game payoffs. She would most like to claim the baby (default) while the other
woman would make no claim (cooperate), in which case, the real mother would receive
custody of the baby. Her second preference could have been, perhaps, that both women
revoke their claims (mutual cooperation) and the baby would go to someone else, but this
was not an option available in the story. The third preference was to revoke her claim
(cooperate) while the false mother insisted on her claim (defaulted) and would receive
custody of the baby. This was, to the real mother, better than mutual insistence on claims
to the baby, which would have resulted in killing the baby (mutual default).
The false mother, driven by jealousy of the real mother rather than care for the
baby, had a Deadlock game preference structure. She would most like to claim the baby
(default) while the real mother revoked her claim. But for her, the second best option was
not having the baby live with others, but depriving everyone of the baby. Thus, her
second preference was insisting on her claim while the real mother insisted as well. The
third preference would have been depriving the real mother of the baby by having both
96

1 Kings 3:16-28. Using Solomon’s trial as an illustration of the Bully game is not the author’s original
idea. However, the author failed to find a reference making this illustration.
97
On King Solomon’s strategy in this trial see: Saul Levmore, Rethinking Group Responsibility and
Strategic Threats in Biblical Texts and Modern Law, 71 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 85, 91-94.
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real and false mothers revoke claims to the baby and hand the baby to others. The worst
option, from the false mother’s perspective, was to revoke her claim while the real
mother insisted on her claim and received custody of the baby.98 The payoff structure is,
therefore:99

False Mother waives
claim on baby

False Mother insists on
claiming baby

Real Mother waives claim
on baby

2,1

1,3

Real Mother insists on
claiming baby

3,0

0,2

Solomon understood that in order to discover the truth in the absence of evidence,
he would need to create an incentive structure that would differentiate between the real
mother (who would have a Chicken game incentive structure) from the false mother (who
would have a Deadlock payoff structure). When the women came before Solomon, each
petitioned for her first preference (being awarded the baby). Since both Chicken and
Bully payoffs have the same first preference, this could not differentiate the two. By
threatening to kill the baby if both women insisted on their claims, Solomon created the
payoff structure of a Bully game. The Deadlock player (false mother) had a credible
threat of defaulting (insisting on the baby even if this led to the baby’s death). Knowing
this, the Chicken player had only one equilibrium—to chicken-out (waive claims to the
baby) in order to reach a {C, D} result, which is better for it than {D, D}. Since the Bully
game has a single equilibrium, in which the Chicken player cooperates and the Deadlock
player defaults, Solomon could know that the woman who cooperated was the Chicken
player, or in other words—the real mother (or, at least, the woman that cared more for the
baby).
Bully games are more stable than Chicken games, but they are even more costly
to enforce (into mutual cooperation) than games of Chicken. It would take significant
expenditures to prevent the Deadlock player from defaulting, and then, the Chicken
98

To summarize, the sets of preferences in the Bully game are, for the Chicken player:
{D,C}>{C,C}>{C,D}>{D,D} and for the Deadlock player: {D,C}>{D,D}>{C,C}>{C,D}.
99
In each box, the real mother’s payoff is noted first, then the false mother’s payoff.
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player would himself have a strong incentive to default. Furthermore, from the static
(single game) point of view, an outcome of {C, D} might not be inefficient; it all depends
on the exact payoffs in the specific circumstances.100 But from a dynamic perspective
(repeating games), the Chicken player will eventually either be eliminated or (if it can)
withdraw from interacting with the ‘bully’ Deadlock player. This would reduce
interaction—and hence network effects—below the level it could be at if the bully were
restrained.
G. Prisoners’ Dilemma
The final game described in this abbreviated taxonomy, and the one in which it is
most costly to enforce the jointly beneficial outcome, is the Prisoners’ Dilemma game.101
One version of the Illustrative story is as follows:102 Two men, Carl and Dan, commit
armed robbery and are arrested on weapons charges. Both suspects are held in separate
rooms where they cannot talk to each other. The district attorney approaches Carl and
says, “We know that you robbed the bank. If you testify against Dan we will let you go
free and Dan will get 15 years; if you don't we have enough to get you on a weapons
charge and you will get three years in jail.” Suspicious of the offer, Carl asks, “What's the
catch?” The district attorney replies, “The catch is that we are offering the same deal to
Dan and if both of you turn in the other, both of you will get 10 years for armed robbery.”
The set of preferences each of the prisoners has is clear. Best of all would be
confessing while the other remains silent (the confessor will receive no jail time, while
the other prisoner will serve 15 years). The second best option would be to remain silent
while the other prisoner remains silent as well (each will serve 3 years for car theft).
Third best would be confessing while the other prisoner confessed (both will serve 10
years for robbery). The worst outcome would be to remain silent while the other prisoner

100

In the case of the payoffs noted in the table, the equilibrium of {C, D} is actually the welfaremaximizing one, with a total of 4 utils—three to the Deadlock player, one to the Chicken player (this, of
course, may create issues regarding the distribution of the gains, regardless of its efficiency).
101
On the Prisoners’ Dilemma game see, e.g., Anatol Rapoport, Prisoner’s Dilemma, in Eatwell, Milgate &
Newman, supra note 67, pp. 199-204.
102
This specific illustrative fact pattern is taken, with minor modifications, from: Richard W. Painter,
Game Theoretic and Contractarian Paradigms in the Uneasy Relationship between Regulators and
Regulatory Lawyers, 65 Fordham L. Rev. 149, 153 (1996), at footnote 24.
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confessed (the silent prisoner will spend 15 years in jail while the confessor will receive
immunity).103 The payoff table is, therefore:104

Dan remains silent

Dan confesses

Carl remains silent

2,2

0,3

Carl confesses

3,0

1,1

The prisoners would maximize their joint welfare by mutual cooperation (in this
case, by both remaining silent)—they will earn a total of 4 utils. The worst possible
outcome (from the perspective of joint welfare) is mutual default (both confess). Yet, if
Carl expects Dan to remain silent, Carl is better off confessing (3 utils as opposed to 2).
And if Carl expects Dan to confess, Carl certainly prefers to confess (1 util instead of 0).
As a result, Carl will confess regardless of what he expects Dan to do. Dan would do the
same. They will mutually default—the worst possible outcome for the two.
An amusing example of the logic leading to mutual default in a Prisoners’
Dilemma is found in Joseph Heller’s “Catch-22”. Yossarian, an officer serving in the
U.S. Air Force during World War II decides to desert the military. Major Danby attempts
to dissuade him, appealing to his sense of duty. Yossarian insists:
“‘am turning my bombsight in for the duration. From now on I’m thinking
only of me.’
Major Danby replied indulgently with a superior smile, ‘But, Yossarian,
suppose everyone felt that way?’
‘Then I’d certainly be a damned fool to feel any other way, wouldn’t
I?’”105
A coordination mechanism (i.e., conveying information to one party on what the
other party will do) does not suffice to alleviate the Prisoners’ Dilemma. Each prisoner
will default regardless of what he expects the other prisoner to do. Also, unlike the Stag
Hunt game, forcing one party to cooperate would not suffice, since the other party will
default even if it knows the first party will cooperate. To enforce mutual cooperation,
103

In other words, as mentioned infra, in Section II.3, the set of preferences for each player in the
Prisoners’ Dilemma game can be summarized as: {D,C}>{C,C}>{D,D}>{C,D}.
104
In each box, Carl’s payoff is noted first, then Jim’s payoff.
105
Joseph Heller, Catch-22 (Simon & Schuster, 1955) 456.
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deterrence or coercion of both players must be effective. Curiously, as discussed
below,106 some of the most beneficial functions, which are more closely associated with
“regulation” (e.g., mitigating opportunism), are of the Prisoners’ Dilemma game type and
are thus mutual cooperation is very costly to enforce in them. Such functions are unlikely
to be able to form spontaneously. It is for these functions that private legal system
evolution is most necessary.
IV. Applying the Theory: The Extant Literature from an Evolutionary Perspective
A. Assessing Enforcement Costs of Regulated Functions
Later subsections will examine how observations made in leading works of
private ordering scholarship support the theory of non-spontaneous evolution of private
legal systems. This theory anticipates that private legal systems begin as networks
regulating low enforcement cost functions, then expand to regulate increasingly
expensive to enforce (but also beneficial) functions. Therefore, a rough idea of the
enforcement costs of the relevant functions is needed.107 As discussed above,108 some of
the more significant criteria include: the average utility of the function to the member,109
the variance in utility among members,110 the market structure both at the network level
(the extent of competition among networks)111 and at the individual level (relative power
of each of the network’s members),112 and the game type of the function.113

106

Infra, in Section IV.3.
Because the works discussed in this section were not created with the theory of non-spontaneous
evolution in mind, they do not contain all the information pertinent to this paper’s thesis. No better can be
done at this time than gaining a rough sense of enforcement costs, and using imperfect descriptions of the
evolution of the networks described in the works discussed in this section. In the future, case studies
specifically aimed at testing this theory may improve on these first steps.
108
See supra, Section II.3.
109
Generally, the higher the utility, the lower the enforcement costs.
110
Generally, the lower the variance, the lower the enforcement costs.
111
The lesser the competition, the lower the enforcement costs. But as stated supra, note 63, reduced
competition among networks is not necessarily net welfare enhancing. A reduction in competition increases
the network’s ability to regulate (which is welfare-enhancing), but also decreases the network’s incentive to
regulate efficiently, which is welfare reducing. Which of these has a greater effect on welfare depends on
particular circumstances.
112
The lesser the market power of the network’s members, the lower the enforcement costs. Network
members with significant market power are more likely to attempt degradation of connectivity within the
network (e.g., not following the rules, transacting outside of the network, etc.). For example, Lisa Bernstein
notes that larger diamond dealers (presumably having more market power than their smaller rivals) often
trade outside of the diamond exchange. See Bernstein, supra note 6, at p. 120 (“Most large and important
dealers are members of the club, but they do not usually conduct their business in the club’s trading hall…
107
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It may be expected that the literature discussing private legal systems would not
contain much variety in the average utility to network members; after all, examining
networks that provide relatively unimportant services is less interesting than investigating
those that serve valuable functions. Variance of benefits is often reflected in game types.
For example, Battle of the Sexes is, as mentioned earlier, a Meeting Place game with an
added feature of variance in the benefits from mutual behavior (i.e., both players prefer
{C,C} and {D,D} over the other outcomes, but one player prefers {C,C} over {D,D}, and
the other—vice versa).
Market structure affects enforcement costs both at the network level (the amount
of competition among regulating networks) and the individual level (the relative power of
each of the network’s members). At the network level, the effects of inter-network
competition have been thoroughly discussed in the antitrust literature,114 and in the
corporations law literature,115 though not quite as much in the private ordering literature.
At the individual level, market structure affects the likelihood of a member degrading
connectivity with the network (e.g., disobeying the network’s rules, transacting outside of
the network and by that weakening the network’s enforcement mechanisms, etc.), which
increases enforcement costs.116 It also often affects the game type of the function.
For example, a Chicken game is more likely to be played in market structures in
oligopoly-like structures in which there are a few, large players of approximately equal
market power (e.g., the social network in a small, rural community), rather than many
large scale transactions tend to be consummated in private offices.”). On the strategy of degradation, see
Jacques Cremer, Patrick Rey & Jean Tirole, Connectivity in The Commercial Internet, 48 J. Indus. Econ.
433 (2000); Aviram, supra note 11, at Section II.3.
113
Assessment of relative enforcement costs of the game types was made as part of discussing each game
type. See supra, Sections III.1 through III.7.
114
See, e.g., William J. Kolasky, Network Effects: A Contrarian View, 7 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 577 (1999);
Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Implications of Network Economic Effects, 86 Cal. L. Rev.
479, 500-523 (1998); William E. Cohen, Competition and Foreclosure in the Context of Installed Base and
Compatibility Effects, 64 Antitrust L. J. 535 (1996); Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., The Antitrust Analysis of
Network Joint Ventures, 47 Hastings L.J. 5 (1995).
115
See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Mark J. Roe, A Theory of Path Dependence in Corporate Ownership
and Governance, 52 Stan. L. Rev. 127, 141 (1999) (arguing that network effects may induce persistence of
pre-existing corporate structures); Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law and Networks of
Contracts, 81 Va. L. Rev. 757 (1995) (discussing the presence and effects of network externalities in
corporate contracts); Larry E. Ribstein & Bruce H. Kobayashi, Choice of Form and Network Externalities,
43 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 79 (2001) (presenting empirical evidence that the choice of form of incorporation
(e.g., partnership, LLP, LLC, corporation) is driven not by network lock-in effects, but by relative business
advantages of a given form over the other forms).
116
See supra, note 112.
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small players or a few unequally powerful players. In contrast, a Bully game is more
likely to characterize payoffs when the market contains one player that is markedly more
powerful than the others. It is this power (and hence lesser vulnerability) that enables that
player to credibly threaten to play “Deadlock” rather than “Chicken”; weaker players
would like to bluff and masquerade as Deadlock players, but lacking market power they
cannot credibly persuade their rivals that they will not back off from defaulting in the
face of the other player’s threat to also default.117
Game types, therefore, are a key criterion in determining enforcement costs, yet
this criterion had not been addressed by the literature on collusion.118 In assessing below
the enforcement costs of functions, the paper will give the most attention to the criterion
of game type, although other criteria will be regarded as well. The remaining subsections
will examine case studies, most of which are leading works in the private ordering
scholarship. The next subsection will discuss case studies of functions characterized by
the lowest enforcement cost game types: Harmony and Meeting Place. Since functions
characterized by low enforcement costs are likely to survive spontaneous formation and
develop effective enforcement mechanisms, it is of no surprise that they become
foundations for more elaborate, and more expensive to enforce, private legal systems.
The final subsection of this section will address functions characterized by higher
enforcement cost game types—Battle of the Sexes, Stag Hunt, Chicken, Bully and
Prisoners’ Dilemma.
B. Lower Enforcement Cost Functions: The Foundations of Private Ordering
Very little of the private ordering literature pays attention to functions
characterized by the lowest enforcement cost game types: Harmony and Meeting Place.

117

There are numerous other structural issues that affect game type. For example, the choice between a
Meeting Place game and a Battle of the Sexes game could depend on whether this is the first time the norm
in question is set, or whether there are competing norms to choose from. If there are competing norms,
most likely each network member has some costs associated with switching to the other norm. As a result,
the member will have a preference for the incumbent norm, even if it would as second preference follow
another norm rather than be the only one using the incumbent norm while all others used the other one.
This is a Battle of the Sexes payoff structure. In contrast, if no member has adopted an existing norm, they
may be indifferent among norm alternatives, as long as one norm is agreed upon and adopted universally—
this is a Meeting Place payoff structure.
118
For a proposed explanation of the reason that the cartel stability literature did not address the game type
criterion, see supra, Section II.3.
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One reason may be that due to the low enforcement costs, the enforcement mechanisms
do not need to be very elaborate. At the extreme, the least-cost game—Harmony—does
not need any enforcement whatsoever, since both players will always choose the action
“C” (cooperate) without regard to what the other player does.119 As a result, neither
coercion nor mere information exchange are necessary to ensure mutual cooperation.
Functions characterized by the Meeting Place game are omnipresent in our lives,
and as this paper argues, they form the nucleus of more elaborate, and more expensive to
enforce private legal systems. The most ubiquitous Meeting Place type function is the
social network. In most cases, people are indifferent (within a certain range of
alternatives) to the choice of location of interaction, type of interaction, etc. If these
alternatives would be considered the “C” and “D” actions, each person is indifferent
between {C,C} and {D,D}. Social interaction requires, however, that both (or all) players
choose the same alternative; they would not beneficially interact if they are in different
locations or if one has come for a swimming competition while the other has come for a
debate match. Therefore, {C,D} and {D,C} are both worse than the mutual alternatives.
This is precisely the Meeting Place game structure.
Similarly, members of religious networks, at least in many places and many eras
in the past, have Meeting Place-type preferences. Most believers benefit from uniformity
in religious doctrine. The choice of religious doctrine is often (especially in societies such
as Tenth Century Europe) not a conscious decision by the believer—one often accepts the
doctrine that is prevalent in one’s locale. But most believers prefer to conform with the
locally accepted doctrine (i.e., a preference for {C,C} and {D,D} over other outcomes,
which is a trait of both Meeting Place and Battle of the Sexes games), and furthermore do
not feel they are better off under one doctrine rather than another (i.e., indifference
between {C,C} and {D,D}, which is the trait of a Meeting Place game but not a Battle of
the Sexes game).
Given the vast variety of social and religious networks and of people’s
preferences in these realms, certainly these assumptions are not always correct. Some
119

See, e.g., Licht, supra note 74, at p. 109: “…one may distinguish between "playing C" in the Harmony
game and "cooperation," where cooperation requires that the actions of parties--which are not in preexistent
harmony--be brought into conformity with one another through negotiation. In its pure form, Harmony
does not call for any cooperation in the sense of conscious policy coordination, as the players
independently converge to the desired CC outcome.” (footnote omitted).
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people enjoy being mavericks, which in game terms means preferring {C,D} and {D,C}
over the other outcomes. More commonly, people do have a certain preference as to
specifics of the religious doctrine or social interaction (e.g., preferring to talk about sports
rather than politics and vice versa). In such cases, the social or religious network will be
characterized by the moderately costly Battle of the Sexes game, rather than the Meeting
Place game. But as mentioned before, people tend to seek the lowest cost regulator. As a
result, groups are likely to expel some members and invite others, so that their
preferences are similar, and thus the characterizing game type is Harmony or Meeting
Place, not Battle of the Sexes. Therefore, people interested in talking about sports will
likely find a social network in which members are most interested to talk about sports. It
would often be more costly to have within the same network also people who dislike
sports and want to talk about politics—even if both groups prefer talking to anyone on
anything over talking about their preferred subjects to themselves, they would still be
better off finding a group interested in addressing the same interests.120 Thus, social,
religious, and other similar networks are likely to evolve in a manner that reduces the cost
of enforcing the most beneficial interaction, by shifting from the Battle of the Sexes game
type to Harmony and Meeting Place game types.
These low enforcement cost networks are the building blocks of private legal
systems. Their low enforcement costs are due not only to being Harmony or Meeting
Place games, but also due to a high average utility people derive from social and spiritual
interaction. Social and religious networks also tend to be more egalitarian—people
cannot “corner” social networks as they can “corner” markets, and though some people
carry more weight than others in social and religious circles, on average these networks
are characterized by lower concentration (and sometimes, by lower barriers to entry)
than, say, diamond exchanges.
Social and religious networks overcome another factor that raises enforcement
costs—competition

120

among

networks—by

increasing

switching

costs

between

Of course, these people might not always find alternative groups that provide the same utility. A
sparsely populated area may not have a great variety of social groups, or sufficient people to form a wide
variety of groups. Furthermore, network effects in larger groups or other benefits of a specific group may
outweigh the benefit of creating a separate group for each social or religious preference.

The Paradox of Spontaneous Formation of Private Legal Systems/Amitai Aviram

46

networks.121 One manner in which switching costs increase is by developing unique
cultures common to the members of that network.122 Since the nuances of common
cultures are costly and time consuming to learn, and the lack of familiarity in them is
easy to detect, they present a relationship-specific investment in a specific social or
religious network. A network member considering disobeying the norms regulated by the
network will lose the investment she made in learning the network’s culture, and will
have to make a new investment in learning the culture of whatever other network she
joins. In the meantime, she would be identified by the new network as an outsider.123
Ethnic-based groups form an even tighter barrier—a person cannot change ethnicity, and
therefore being expelled from or leaving one’s ethnic network is irreplaceable.124
The private ordering literature notes the importance of reputation in facilitating
private legal systems.125 Yet this scholarship often fails to note that the disciplining effect
of reputation depends on the group in which this reputation is collected. As discussed in
the Pax Dei context, creating a reputation mechanism in a spontaneously formed private
legal system is futile, as once the system fails, any reputation contained within it will not
be meaningful in itself. However, when a preexisting, low enforcement cost system, such
as a social network, expands and uses its information mechanism (e.g., reputation within
the social network), this reputation has an effect even after the failure of the higher-end
function (restricting warfare, in the Pax Dei case), since the social network is stable and
will continue to exist indefinitely. Thus, a warlord who has acquired a poor reputation
121

See, e.g., Greif, Milgrom & Weingast, supra note 9, at p. 757-758: “These guilds, therefore, were able to
provide their members with streams of rents in their hometowns. Receiving these rents, however, could
have been made conditional on following the recommendations, rules, and directives of the guild. Hence
these rents could serve to tie a member to the guild by making change of residence costly and to ensure
solidarity among the guild’s members.”
122
Of course, reducing competition among networks is just one of the reasons for creating a common
culture within a group, and possibly not the leading on. There are other reasons for the creation of a
common culture, including satisfying a need to feel associated with a group. Regardless of the reason, the
existence of a common culture reduces competition among social and religious networks and thus reduces
the enforcement costs of the network.
123
On viewing people as outsiders, even a decade after they joined the a community, see Ellickson, supra
note 9, at p. 678: “As the Association President later explained in a hearing before the county Board of
Supervisors, the problem was that Ellis, a country resident for a decade, ‘hasn’t been [in the County] all
that long.’”
124
As Richard Posner observes, some primitive societies have bypassed the non-duplicability of kinship by
instituting “barter friendships”, which oblige the parties to similar standards of loyalty as they owe their
kinsmen . See Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Primitive Society, with Special Reference to Law, 23 J. Law
& Econ. 1 (1980).
125
See supra, notes 29-31.
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may suffer ostracism from the social or religious network even if and after the high-cost
function (restricting warfare) has failed.
One might argue that religious networks govern not by providing to people’s
spiritual needs, but by invoking the power of God. According to this critique, there is
something unique about the belief that one is abiding to the will of an omnipotent being,
and it is fear of God (or of Hell) that makes one willing to voluntarily follow a course of
action that would otherwise not be contemplated. But this cannot be a complete answer to
the effectiveness of religious networks, even in a highly religious (and superstitious)
society of Tenth Century Europe. Some warlords must have been cynical about the
likelihood of divine repercussions to refusing Pax Dei. These cynics had much to gain if
they refused to adhere to the oaths’ limitations while other warlords felt constrained (after
all, if this is a Prisoners’ Dilemma game and the other player was going to cooperate, a
defaulting warlord would find himself in the best outcome for him). Other warlords may
have thought that divine will supports any means to their accession to power; after all,
people are prone to adopt views the consequences of which are favorable to them.
Anecdotal evidence also suggests that the threat of divine sanction was not a
panacea, nor a necessary ingredient for stable private legal systems. Some important
private legal systems of approximately the same era were facilitated by non-religious
mechanisms. For example, Lex Mercatoria, the medieval customary law of merchants,
was enforced by secular, merchant courts. A merchant who ignored their decrees would
risk reputation sanctions that likely would cause most merchants to refuse to do business
with the offender.126 Furthermore, the threat of divine sanction very often failed to direct
behavior and resolve disputes, even in the Middle Ages, and even when the parties
involved were the clergy. For example, the Great Schism, in which two cardinals claimed
to hold to the position of Pope, could not be solved by the church’s legal machinery.127
126

See, e.g., Paul R. Milligram, Douglass C. North & Barry R. Weingast, The Role of Institutions in the
Revival of Trade: The Law Merchant, Private Judges, and the Champagne Fairs, 2 J. Econ. and Pol. 1
(1990); Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code's Search for Immanent
Business Norms, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1765 (1996); Eyal Benvenisti, Exit and Voice in the Age of
Globalization, 98 Mich. L. Rev. 167, 176 (1999), at footnote 35. An important reason for the inability of
the Law Merchant to rely on religious enforcement was that the merchants governed by it were of different
religious persuasions. This did not, however, prevent the formation of a stable private legal system,
enforced by other social networks.
127
The Great Schism: Manifesto of the Revolting Cardinals, Aug 5, 1378, in Oliver J. Thatcher, and Edgar
Holmes McNeal, eds., A Source Book for Medieval History, (New York: Scribners, 1905), pp. 326-327,
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Finally, a General Council of prelates convened, forced out the two popes and elected
another pope.128 This General Council was the backbone of the network that provided
spiritual services, and was itself a social network. If fear of divine sanctions motivated
the people, then a decree from God’s agent on earth (whichever of the popes a person
believed was legitimate) would determine this conflict. Rather, the mobilization of the
bulk of the social/religious network suggests that it was the support of this network that
was crucial to any resolution of the conflict.
Low enforcement cost functions have received very modest attention in the
private ordering community. Richard McAdams discusses the importance of the social
network in forming and regulating norms. His ‘Esteem Theory of Norms’ argues that
people are induced to cooperate by receiving esteem from the group—a non-material
good that is one’s status within a group.129 The groups McAdams refers to are generally
ones that this paper would term as Harmony or Meeting Place game types; usually, social
networks. The advantage of esteem as a regulating mechanism, according to McAdams,
is that esteem sanctions are very inexpensive for each group member to administer.130
Again, this argument is in the same vein as the proposition that the Harmony and Meeting
Place type networks are the least-cost enforcers. McAdams adds another feature that
enhances compliance—esteem competition. Esteem is relative, and thus compliance by

available at: http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/source/grtschism1.html; The Great Schism: University of
Paris and the Schism, 1393, in Oliver J. Thatcher, and Edgar Holmes McNeal, eds., A Source Book for
Medieval History, (New York: Scribners, 1905), pp. 326-327, available at:
http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/source/grtschism2.html; The Great Schism: Council of Pisa, Competency
to Try Popes, 1409, in Oliver J. Thatcher, and Edgar Holmes McNeal, eds., A Source Book for Medieval
History, (New York: Scribners, 1905), pp. 327-328, available at:
http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/source/grtschism3.html;
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See, e.g., Norman P. Tanner (ed.), Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils: Council of Constance 1414-18,
available at: http://www.piar.hu/councils/ecum16.htm.
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Richard H. McAdams, Cooperation and Conflict: The Economics of Group Status Production and Race
Discrimination, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 1003, 1019 (1995): “If neither material self-interest nor altruism
explains the residuum of cooperation, what can? And why does the level of cooperation vary so
significantly with the manner in which individuals are categorized by group? This section proposes an
answer: group-based status production. In the experiments discussed above, individuals behave selfishly,
not altruistically, but their selfish end is the production of the non-material good of esteem. If individuals
seek such nonmaterial ends, members of social groups have another means of solving collective action
problems—by allocating esteem to induce members to make contributions to group welfare.”
130
Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 Mich. L. Rev. 338, 365
(1997): “The key feature of esteem is that individuals do not always bear a cost by granting different levels
of esteem to others. Because the cost is often zero, esteem sanctions are not necessarily subject to the
second-order collective action problem that makes the explanation of norms more difficult.”

The Paradox of Spontaneous Formation of Private Legal Systems/Amitai Aviram

49

some people raises the cost of non-compliance for the others, since the esteem collected
by the compliant parties devalues the group status of non-complying members.131
McAdams’ esteem theory does not differentiate between groups, however, and as
a result does not address the evolutionary pattern of private legal systems described in
this paper. As discussed above, different “groups” (i.e., regulating networks) have widely
varying enforcement costs. If all groups were the same, spontaneous formation would be
possible for every network. But this is not the case; low-enforcement cost functions (and
the networks that enforce them) are the only ones that are likely to survive spontaneous
formation, and they expand to encompass other, more expensive to enforce functions,
which in turn strengthens further their enforcement mechanisms. In the next sub-section
the paper will proceed to examine the more expensive to enforce game types and the
private ordering literature that addresses them.
C. Higher Enforcement Cost Functions: Gradual Evolution of Private Ordering
The private ordering literature on functions that are more expensive to enforce is
much richer than that on low-cost functions. The high cost functions are more elaborate,
and more closely resemble the public legal system (i.e., “the law”). This subsection
observes case studies from the private ordering literature and examines how expensiveto-enforce functions usually evolve from Harmony or Meeting Place type of functions.
These functions include moderately expensive, Battle of the Sexes type functions such as
forming exchanges132 and merchant coalitions,133 as well as more expensive, Chicken and
Prisoners’ Dilemma type functions such as prohibiting opportunistic behavior in
exchanges,134 restricting warfare and resolving trespass disputes between neighbors.135
The exceptions to this rule are also noted. In some cases, moderately expensive
game types (such as Battle of the Sexes) require disciplining a group of individuals that
are not all members of any single inexpensive function (such as a social or religious
group), and therefore none of the inexpensive networks can evolve to attend to the
131

McAdams, id., at p. 366: “Because the desire for esteem is relative, competition for esteem can
progressively raise the standard the norm imposes.”
132
For example, diamond exchanges described in Bernstein, supra note 6; Bernstein, supra note 21.
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Such as the Maghribi traders coalition described in Greif, supra note 6 and Greif, supra note 26.
134
Bernstein, supra note 6; Bernstein, supra note 21.
135
Ellickson (1991), supra note 6; Ellickson, supra note 9.
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moderately expensive function. For example, traders from different regions and religions
may not share a single social or religious network that could expand to regulate trading
interaction. In some cases, such as merchant coalitions in Mexican California136 and preHanseatic League German Kontore (merchant organizations),137 a regulating network
managed to spontaneously form despite the lack of a low enforcement cost foundation.
However, as discussed below, these private legal systems were not very effective, and
could not evolve to regulate higher-enforcement cost functions such as coordinating a
multilateral punishment. This led, in the case of the German merchants, to the formation
of the Hanseatic League—an expansion of the underlying, low enforcement cost social
function to cover the individuals that required regulation of a higher cost function
(providing security to merchants while abroad). Once formed, the Hanseatic League
quickly evolved to form a more effective replacement to the pre-League Kontore. These
findings support the theory espoused above, in Section II.
Merchant coalitions and exchanges typically exhibit Battle of the Sexes game
type characteristics. Merchant coalitions, for example, protect participating merchants
from being defrauded by their agents by conveying information on prospective agents’
honesty, and possibly by coordinating a boycott of dishonest merchants.138 Different
merchants have differing vulnerabilities to agent dishonesty: some think they are better at
identifying honest agents; others do not use agents very frequently, or only use trusted
family members as agents. As a result, there is a disparity in how different merchants
view the risk of agent dishonesty, and hence the investment they are willing to make in
the coalition to reduce this problem.
In this case, the “C” action would be a large investment in identifying and
punishing dishonest agents (perhaps it includes a duty to refrain to deal with any agent
the coalition deems dishonest, no matter how profitable dealing with him may be to a
specific merchant), while the “D” action would be a small investment in identifying
dishonest agents. The more vulnerable merchants will prefer a {C,C}outcome over all
others, while their less vulnerable counterparts will prefer a {D,D} outcome. However,
136

Described in Clay, supra note 6.
Described in Greif, Milgrom & Weingast, supra note 9.
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See, e.g., Greif, supra note 6, at p. 526; Greif, supra note 26, at p. 858-859; Clay, supra note 6, at p.
203.
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both would opt for either of the mutual outcomes rather than disagree {C,D} or {D,C}, in
which case no coalition will form and each merchant will have to fend for their own—the
worst outcome for all merchants. This is a Battle of the Sexes preference set.139
Similar to merchant coalitions, exchanges also exhibit Battle of the Sexes
characteristics. Any given norms of trading favor some over others. Smaller merchants
lacking facilities to operate 24 hours a day prefer to limit the scope of time in which
trading is possible.140 Other traders might benefit from certain trading systems and be
harmed from alternative trading systems. Again, however, due to the network effects
involved in having a large market, most members prefer trading in a larger, more liquid
market with somewhat less favorable trading rules, than trading in a small, illiquid
market that uses the rules most favorable to them.
In some cases, markets split, just like social and religious groups described in the
previous sub-section, in order to accommodate the preferences of smaller groups and turn
the network’s characteristic game type into Harmony or Meeting Place. However, this is
less frequent in exchanges and merchant coalitions, perhaps because network effects tend
to peak earlier in social and religious groups, while the network effects of an exchange
are still large enough to outweigh the greater enforcement costs of regulating the
heterogeneous preferences of the members; and perhaps because the maintenance of a
market, which is a Battle of the Sexes function, is closely tied to a more expensive,
Prisoners’ Dilemma type function—that of mitigating opportunistic behavior in
transactions within the market. Mitigating opportunism is characterized by the Prisoners’
Dilemma game because each merchant would most like to be able to be opportunistic
while others are not; then, as a second preference, she would like that neither she nor
others would be opportunistic. Her third preference is that both she and the others are
opportunistic, because, if everyone else is acting opportunistically, she’d be a fool not to,
wouldn’t she? This, of course, is the preference set for a Prisoners’ Dilemma game.
Since markets often undertake to both facilitate exchange (Battle of the Sexes
game) and mitigate opportunism (Prisoners’ Dilemma game), splitting a market so as to
139

See supra, Section III.3.
See, e.g., Justice Brandeis’ reasoning in: Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 38
S.Ct.242, 62 L.Ed. 683 (1918). For a critique of this reasoning, see: Robert H. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox
(Free Press, 1993) 41-47.
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reduce preference heterogeneity among members will not reduce enforcement costs since
it does not reduce significantly the costs associated with mitigating opportunism. More
importantly, scaling down and reducing preference heterogeneity is usually made
unnecessary because the higher-cost functions—maintaining a market and reducing
opportunism in it—can be regulated by evolving a lower-cost regulator, typically a social
or religious network. For example, Janet Landa discusses trading relationships among
ethnically homogenous group of Chinese traders engaged in the marketing of rubber in
Singapore and West Malaysia, and explains how homogeneity facilitates more efficient
trading among the group’s members.141. Similarly, Lisa Bernstein’s important study of
diamond exchanges observes that the diamond industry has been dominated by Orthodox
Jews,142 and that Jewish law,143 religious courts,144 and social activities.145
Barak Richman expands Bernstein’s insights, making a direct connection between
the social/religious network of Orthodox Jews and the mitigation of opportunism in
diamond dealing.146 Forming a model that takes into account network effects of religious
goods provided by the Orthodox Jewish community,147 Richman exposes how religious
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Janet T. Landa, A Theory of The Ethnically Homogenous Middleman Group: An Institutional Alternative
to Contract Law, 10 J. Leg. Stud. 349 (1981).
142
Bernstein, supra note 6, at p. 140: “Because the diamond industry has long been dominated by Orthodox
Jews, it was able to take advantage of the existence of these conditions [Homogenous Group Regime—
A.A.].”
143
Id., at p. 141: “Jewish law provided detailed substantive rules of commercial behavior… Jewish law also
provides rules governing the making of oral contracts and lays down rules for conducting commercial
arbitration. In the diamond industry, Jewish law provided a code of commercial fair dealing…”
144
Id., Id.: “…the Jewish community provided an array of extralegal dispute resolution institutions… under
Jewish law, a Jew is forbidden to voluntarily go into the courts of non-Jews to resolve commercial disputes
with another Jew. Should he do so, he is to be ridiculed and shamed.”
145
Id., at p. 139: “The Diamond Dealers Club still functions like an old-fashioned mutual-aid society. It
provides kosher restaurants for its members. A Jewish health organization provides emergency medical
services, and social committees are organized by neighborhood to visit sick members and their families.
There is a synagogue on the premises, and contributions to a benevolent fund are required. Group discounts
on packaged family vacations are also available so that members’ families can travel together during the
month that the bourse is closed.”
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Barak D. Richman, Community Enforcement of Informal Contracts: Jewish Diamond Merchants in New
York, Harvard John M. Olin Discussion Paper No. 384 (2002), available at:
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=349040.
147
Richman, id., at p. 34-35 (“…the Ultra-Orthodox preference for religious goods fits very comfortably
into the notion of a utility function. They truly gain enjoyment—the definition of utility—by participating
in religious activities such as attending synagogue, studying religious texts, and performing holiday or lifecycle rituals. Moreover, many of these activities require the participation of fellow communitarian
members, this one member’s enjoyment from these activities is partly dependent on the character of his
colleagues.” [emphasis added]).
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obligations encompass contractual compliance and fair disclosure,148 and how the
religious community’s institutions enforce commercial norms,149 sometimes with extreme
subtlety.150 The regulation of a high enforcement cost function (such as mitigating
opportunistic behavior) can be done jointly be more than one pre-existing network;
Richman points out to dual, symbiotic regulation of diamond dealing by both the social
and the religious networks.151 These findings corroborate this paper’s expectation that the
Prisoners’ Dilemma-type, high enforcement cost function of mitigating opportunistic
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Richman, id., at p. 35-38 (“Complying with contractual obligations thus take [sic] on an awesome,
divine quality. Fulfilling one’s contractual obligations is an act that, like other religious behavior, is
commanded by the divine law… Jewish legal commandments for ethical behavior in commerce extend
beyond contract compliance. The doctrine of the ‘just price’ and the theory of ‘misrepresentation’ also use
religious language and divine incentives to compel efficient behavior. The just price doctrine led to strict
rules for accurate weights and measures… Ultra-Orthodox merchants view their actions as a part of moral
example they assume as members of a religious community…”).
149
Richman, id., at p. 38-41 (“One blunt instrument is to use rabbinical courts to excommunicate an
offender… Rabbinical courts are more likely to impose less severe measures, such as stripping an
individual of a community honor… or an order to make a charitable contribution to a community charity.
Nonetheless, the mere power to excommunicate, even if it is rarely invoked, is probably the most effective
instrument the rabbinical courts have to induce cooperation. The [New York Diamond Dealers Club]
arbitration committee itself can initiate a proceeding in a rabbinical court, and the close connection between
the two forums illustrates the diamond industry’s reliance on community institutions to help enforce
contracts. Less format institutions also play a role in enforcing contractual compliance. When the
community is familiar with a member’s failure to comply with contractual obligations, a withholding of
excludable community goods… often occurs. Excludable religious goods include participation roles in
daily prayer, honors in life-cycle ceremonies, and access to classes or teachers that are in limited supply or
enrollment in particularly select educational institutions… Hovering throughout those specific goods is
community respect… One outstanding expression of community respect pertains to how easily—and with
how prominent a family—parents can arrange their children to marriage.”).
150
Richman, id., at p. 40, quoting an unidentified diamond merchant: “It doesn’t really happen very often,
but sometimes an individual has poor judgment and is unable to deliver on a business promise… We don’t
try to punish him—you have to understand the financial pressures that come with the business and with the
burdens of raising a large family. But we remember. So he probably doesn’t get Shishi [the sixth Torah
reading in Sabbath services, which is considered a great honor among many Ultra-Orthodox].” This
withdrawal of but a few community goods allows greater proportional and incremental sanctions than do
the public (and many alternative private) legal systems.
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Richman, id., at p. 37 (“The threat of flight from the community, though extremely unlikely, is possible,
and Ultra-Orthodox communities do watch some members leave for less observant communities or other
Ultra-Orthodox sects. Such defections from the community can dilute the effectiveness of community
enforcement, and membership in the Ultra-Orthodox community may be a necessary but not a sufficient
condition to another’s diamonds. Accordingly, diamond merchants will look for other assurances that will
keep a diamond contractor committed to cooperation, such as a merchant’s family or social connections to
the community…”). Also see Richman, id. at p. 37, citing Eli Berman, Sect, Subsidy and Sacrifice: An
Economic View of Ultra-Orthodox Jews, Q. J. Econ. (August 2000) (discussing expectations within the
Ultra-Orthodox Jewish community that a male will remain a full-time student of religious studies for
several years after he has begun a family, so that by the time he assumes economic responsibilities, he has a
spouse and children entrenched in the community, and thus he is less likely to depart and is deemed more
trustworthy).
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behavior in commercial transactions would be regulated by networks that originally
provided low enforcement cost functions (the social and religious networks).
Low enforcement cost functions evolve to regulate not only Battle of the Sexes
and Prisoners’ Dilemma type functions, but also Bully and Chicken games. Robert
Ellickson’s influential work on the resolution of cattle trespass disputes among neighbors
in rural Shasta County provides a lucid example.152 Some residents of Shasta County own
large numbers of cattle, and graze them in the “traditional” way, i.e., let them roam freely
in unfenced areas.153 The cattle occasionally stray into neighbors’ lands, destroying
gardens and otherwise harming the property. Since it is not realistic for a rancher to
control his cattle, preventing the cattle from trespassing requires either that the cattle be
fenced in, or that the neighbors’ properties be fenced out.
The interaction between two ranchers who grade cattle traditionally is (roughly)
characterized by the Chicken game. Each rancher would most want his neighbor to fence
his lands (action “C”), while he does not fence (action “D”). This would prevent most
trespass incidents by fencing his cattle out of his neighbor’s property and the neighbor’s
cattle out of his property. The rancher may be indifferent between {C,C} and {C,D}, with
perhaps a slight preference for mutual cooperation, as double fencing might eliminate an
occasional trespass that a single fence did not. Finally, the worst outcome for the rancher
is {D,D}, since the damage from the neighbor’s cattle trespassing on his property is
greater than the cost of fencing the neighbor’s cattle out.

152

Ellickson developed a specific game to describe the relationship between the ranchers in Shasta County.
See Ellickson (1991), supra note 6, at 162-164. This game, which he called “specialized labor”, has the
following payoff structure:

Build Fence

Build Fence
3,3

Shirk
0,7

Shirk
7,-2
1,1
While this game may be more refined to the specifics of Shasta County trespass disputes, the Chicken and
Bully games also fit the situation reasonably well. Since this paper attempts a preliminary study of the
implications of game types on a function’s enforcement costs (and thus, on the evolution of private legal
systems), the analysis focuses on generic games, that are comparable across many different case studies.
153
Ellickson, supra note 9, at p. 637-638. Compare these “traditionalists” to the “modernists”, who keep
their cattle fenced and use sprinklers to maintain the ranchland vegetation during the summer. Id., at pp.
638-639.
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But not all farmers pose equal risks of cattle trespass. Ellickson notes that some
ranchers fence their cattle,154 and some others are ranchette owners who do not raise
cattle (or at least not a significant amount of cattle), and only pose a rare risk of trespass
by their horse or dog.155 The asymmetrical risks change the preference ranking of the
riskier rancher. Not fearing being a victim of trespass, he would prefer that neither party
fence (i.e., {D,D}) rather than he would need to fence ({C,C} and {C,D}). His preference
order: {D,C}, {D,D}, {C,C}, {C,D} is that of a Deadlock player. The other, vulnerable
rancher or ranchette owner still maintains the Chicken player’s preferences. The result, as
discussed above,156 is a Bully game.
Both of these are high enforcement costs games, and the fact that different
residents of Shasta County pose widely different risks of trespass also raises enforcement
costs. Thus, absent low-enforcement cost foundations it would have been very difficult, if
at all possible, to spontaneously form a network regulating the prevention and resolution
of trespass disputes. On the other hand, the people affected by these disputes are
geographically concentrated in one region, and are almost entirely within a single social
network.157 Furthermore, several structural features of the social network in Shasta
County reduce its enforcement costs. First and foremost, there are no real competitive
alternatives to the social network; the area is not densely populated, and people in the
area seem to belong to a single social circle. Second, though the population in the area
has grown over time, most families have been in the area for a long time—often several
generations—increasing the investment they have in the social network.158 Third, the
154

Id., at pp. 638-639.
Id., at p. 636 (“Ranchette owners may keep a farm animal or two as a hobby, but few of them make
significant income from agriculture”), and p. 674 (“Even the ranchette owners have, if not a few hobby
livestock, at least several dogs, which they keep for companionship, security, and pest control. Unlike
cattle, dogs that trespass may harass, or even kill, other farm animals.”)
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See supra, Section III.6.
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The people who are on the edge of the social network and least connected to it are usually those who
disobey the cattle trespass norms most frequently. Id., at p.676-677, and p. 685 (“In both instances [of
trespass lawsuits—A.A.] neither the trespass victim nor the cattle owner was well-socialized in rural Shasta
County norms. Thus other respondents tended to refer to the four individuals involved in these two claims
as ‘bad apples’, ‘odd ducks,’ or otherwise as people not aware of the natural working order.”)
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Id., at p. 634 (“Approximately half of these ranches are owned by descendants of families that have been
in the county for several generations.”), and p. 677 (“People tend to know one another, and they value their
reputations in the community. Some ranching families have lived in the area for several generations and
plan to stay indefinitely. Members of these families seem particularly intent on maintaining their
reputations as good neighbors. Should one of them not promptly and courteously retrieve an estray, he
might fear that any resulting gossip would permanently besmirch the family name.”)
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population is relatively homogenous in its power—generally, none of the families can
force their will on other families. Physical violence is very limited, and in the rare cases
that it occurs, seems to be aimed at a trespassing cattle and serve as punishment for the
trespass,159 not as intimidation. Political battles are also complex, and no family or group
of families has control over such political struggles as decisions on ordinances affecting
cattle trespass liability.160 Finally, the issue of cattle trespass of preventing cattle trespass
is, on average, important to the members of the social network, so the average utility
from regulating the matter is significant.
It would come as no surprise, therefore, that the social network has evolved to
regulate cattle trespass matters. Ellickson’s work does not focus on the chronological
evolution of the norms, so it is not possible to demonstrate from his work the
chronological path that this paper’s theory anticipates. It is clear, however, that the social
network has handled other, lower-cost functions; members of the social network interact
on “water supply, controlled burns, fence repairs, social events staffing the volunteer fire
department,” etc.161 Some of these functions are lower-cost than the expensive to enforce
Bully and Chicken games. By and large, the social network manages to contain disputes,
and the norm is not to act on a single incident of trespass, but only on a chronic
imbalance of behavior (i.e., repeated incidents of being harmed by the neighbor, without
sufficient redeeming occasions in which either the person received a favor form his
neighbor, or the person harmed the neighbor).162 When discipline is necessary, the main
disciplinary action is spreading negative gossip. As Ellickson assesses: “This usually
works because only the extreme deviants are immune from the general obsession with
neighborliness.”163
Furthermore, it is very clear that the social network—the concept on
neighborliness—is the key driver to cooperation. Many quotes provided by Ellickson
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Id., at p. 678-679.
See the description of the politics of issuing closed-range ordinances. Id., at pp. 643-653.
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stress the neighborliness theme.164 One cattleman states: “I think the whole thing is good
neighbors. If you don’t have good neighbors, you can forget the whole thing.”165
Shasta County presents a case study in which the enforcement costs of the lowcost nucleus are unusually low. In contrast, when the low-cost nucleus is weak or nonexistent, some higher-enforcement cost functions manage to spontaneously form, but
their enforcement abilities are poor and they often either ultimately fail or are at least
unable to evolve to regulate higher-cost functions. Compare two observations on
merchant coalitions—Avner Greif’s work on Maghribi traders in the Middle Ages
Mediterranean Sea, with Karen Clay’s work on merchants in 1830s Mexican California.
Greif describes a merchant coalition of Maghribi traders, a group of Jewish merchants
who originally lived in the Abbasid caliphate (centered in Baghdad), and then migrated to
North Africa. The Maghribi traders retained some distinct self-identity,166 but did not
establish a separate community apart from the Jewish communities in which they
lived.167 They made use of the Jewish community’s enforcement mechanisms.168
In contrast, Karen Clay’s description of trade in Mexican California circa 1830s
indicates a mix of traders from various European countries, or of European or EuropeanNative American descent.169 While British and American traders seemed to be more
dominant than others, and while many of them converted to Catholicism and became
Mexican citizens,170 diversity among the merchant population was too great to allow a
strong sense of community.171 Furthermore, most merchants held significant market
164

Id., at p. 681: (“Tony Morton: ‘[I never press a monetary claim because] I try to be a good neighbor.’
Norman Wagoner: ‘Being good neighbors means no lawsuits.’”)
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Quoting Chuck Searle. Id., at p. 624.
166
Greif, supra note 6, at p. 862: “Although the Maghribi immigrants integrated into existing Jewish
communities, they also retained a strong sense of identity and solidarity among themselves… In 1030 a
letter from Fustat to the head of the yeshiva in Jerusalem happily reports that some Maghribis have joined
the Fustat yeshiva’s synagogue. Twenty-four years later, in a report sent to Jerusalem concerning the
condition of that synagogue, the ‘Maghribi people’ are still mentioned as a separate group.”
167
Id., Id.: “It is important to note that the Maghribi traders did not establish a separate religious-ethnic
community apart from the Jewish community. Nor did they represent a ‘natural’ group, which binds
together individuals in all (or at least most) important aspects of their lives.”
168
Id., at pp. 862-863: “Indeed, when a Maghribi trader wanted to impose social sanctions against another
trader, he made a public appeal to the Jewish communities.”
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Clay, supra note 6, at pp. 204-207.
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Id., at p. 206.
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One possible explanation for the failure of a common religion to bind the merchants and ensure their
honesty is that in this particular case it seems that conversion to Catholicism was a necessity for a nonCatholic in order to settle in the area. As a result, many converted opportunistically, and had little true
affiliation to the religion. Thus, the religious institutions may not have had much power over some of their
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power, as in many towns there were only a few active merchants, and sometimes a town
contained a single merchant.172 The difference in the effectiveness of the enforcement
mechanisms was significant. While the traders in Mexican California exchanged
information on dishonest colleagues, they very rarely succeeded in imposing collective
punishment. The Maghribi traders, on the other hand, used collective punishment much
more frequently.173
The significant enforcement advantage of an exclusion mechanism over an
information mechanism is demonstrated in Greif, Milgrom and Weingast’s examination
of the evolution of merchant guilds in medieval Europe.174 They describe the difficulties
of German merchants to secure a commitment from the rulers of foreign trade centers to
protect them and their property while in the trade center. The foreign rulers had a strong
incentive to promise protection, in order to attract foreign commerce. However, once the
traders made an investment and brought their property to the foreign town, their goods
became an attractive target for confiscation, and their protection was quite costly. As a
result, rulers often reneged on their vows to protect foreign traders.
One way to protect the traders was for their government to threaten the foreign
ruler with military responses to harm visited upon the merchants in the ruler’s territory.
But in the high Middle Ages defense (such as castles) was more powerful than offense,

half-hearted flock. In addition, Catholicism was ubiquitous in the region. While social and religious
networks have network effects (positive returns to scale of membership), network effects are not infinite.
There is a gradual dilution in the binding power of a social or religious network as it expands. The flip side
of this phenomenon is that in small groups that are outcast or harshly treated by people outside of the
group, the members of the group tend to adhere more to the group norms. See, e.g., Yoram Barzel,
Confiscation by the Ruler: The Rise and Fall of Jewish Lending in the Middle Ages, 35 J. L. & Econ. 1
(1992) (discussing how discrimination against Jews in many professions allowed them to effectively bond
themselves in the banking industry). For a similar point regarding cartel enforcement (which is a group
norm) see: Bruce H. Kobayashi, Antitrust, Agency and Amnesty: An Economic Analysis of the Criminal
Enforcement of the Antitrust Laws Against Corporations, 69 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 715, 742 (2001) (arguing
that high antitrust penalties may deter defection from cartels).
172
Greif, supra note 6, at p. 214: “While the Maghribi traders moved their business easily from one
merchant in a port to one of the several other merchants in the port, at most a few California merchants or,
in some cases, only one were active in each town.”
173
Id., Id.: “The striking thing about the merchant coalition in California is the infrequent use of collective
punishment. The other context in which we observe a merchant coalition is the western Mediterranean
during the eleventh century (Greif, 1989, 1993). In both cases, disputes between principals and agents
inevitably arose because of imperfections in the information network and contingencies not specified in the
implicit or explicit contract. In the western Mediterranean, however, the Maghribi traders used collective
punishment more frequently in the course of their interactions.”
174
Greif, Milgrom & Weingast, supra note 9, at pp. 758-762.
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and therefore attacking a fortified rival was a costly affair.175 Also, as Greif notes, “in the
age prior to the emergence of the nation-state, alien merchants could expect little military
or political aid from their countrymen.”176 As a result, the threat of war was not very
credible.
Another, more feasible way to protect traders was to credibly threaten the ruler
with a merchant boycott of his town. Enforcement of this boycott was crucial, since some
merchants either had more to lose from the boycott, or felt more secure than others.
Merchant guilds served to enforce the boycotts. The guilds built on the existing social
network of the individual town, and therefore most guilds regulated merchants residing in
a given town.177 Their enforcement powers came both from the town’s social network
and from the town governance institutions.
The volume of trade in most major Italian cities was sufficient that a guild
governing merchants of a single town could deter a foreign ruler from reneging on a
promise to protect the merchants. Not so for the German towns. Since each town’s
volume of trade was relatively small compared to towns of other nations,178 they German
towns could not individually coordinate a sufficient sanction to discipline foreign rules.
Thus, the German merchants tried to coordinate by forming Kontore—offices in the
foreign cities, which represented and coordinated the actions of merchants of all German
towns.179 However, the Kontor was not based on a low-cost enforcer such as a tight social
network; the social network containing all German merchants was much weaker that the
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Id., at p. 759.
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social network containing the merchants in a given town. Being disconnected from the
social networks of the individual towns, the Kontor could not impose sanctions on
merchants in the towns in which they resided.180
As Greif, Milgrom and Weingast describe, this weakness led to the
ineffectiveness of the Kontor. In 1280, many foreign guilds, including the German
Kontor, declared an embargo of Bruges and moved their trade to Aardenburg in response
to Bruges’ failure to protect foreign merchants. After two years, Bruges capitulated and
agreed to protect the merchants. However, while it respected this agreement in regards to
the rights of some merchants, it ignored the agreement in its treatment of German
merchants.181 Bruges realized that the Kontor lacked sufficient enforcement power; it
lacked any control over German merchants not present in Bruges, and could not enforce
its decisions in the hometowns of the German merchants. Therefore, while Bruges had to
yield to the embargo of the more effective Spanish and Italian merchant organizations, it
was not intimidated by the Kontor, and thus reneged on its agreement with the Kontor.182
Following this failure, the German towns realized that in order to form an
effective regulator of merchant operations they had to build on the foundations of the
low-cost social network. But as these networks were too small to have a sufficient effect
on the foreign rulers, they created a network of (social) networks, expanding the social
and political network to encompass the more important German mercantile towns. This
new social and political institution was known as the Hanseatic League.183 Though it
initially dealt with matters of governance within the towns, it quickly expanded to control
the merchants’ affairs abroad. Initially, there was some friction between this social
network and the older, town-based network. Thus, when an embargo was declared on
Norway in 1284, merchants from the city of Bremen refused to cooperate. The network

180

Id., id.
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Id., at p. 760.
183
Id., at p. 760-761. The original meaning of the ‘Hanse’ was a toll collected by the merchants in a
specific town (in some cases the toll was also collected from foreign merchants who had presence in that
town). See Medieval Sourcebook: Siegfried, Archbishop of Bremen: Remittance of the "Hanse" (1181),
available at: http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/source/1181hanse1.html. A set of alliances between the
Hanse created the Hanseatic League. See, e.g., Agreement between Hamburg and Lubeck for Protection
(1241), available at: http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/source/1241lubeckhamburg.html.
181

The Paradox of Spontaneous Formation of Private Legal Systems/Amitai Aviram

61

between the other German towns was by then strong enough, however, that they excluded
Bremen’s merchants from the all the German Kontore.184 By 1307, the Hanseatic League
had evolved to successfully regulate merchant behavior of all its members. In that year it
had again declared an embargo on Bruges, this time acting on its own (without
participation of other foreign merchants). After a two year boycott Bruges conceded, and
this time, facing effective coordination of the German merchants, honored its
commitments.185
This case study supports the theory of non-spontaneous evolution. The
former part of the story—an attempt to enforce an embargo by spontaneously formed
Kontore that were not based on lower-cost foundations, supports the argument that the
paradox of spontaneous formation is likely to doom all but low enforcement cost
networks to fail, or at most to be limited in effectiveness. Enforcing an embargo, like
enforcing a cartel, or restricting warfare, is either a Prisoners’ Dilemma186 or a Stag
Hunt187 type function. These higher enforcement cost functions can only rarely, in very
favorable market structures, survive spontaneous formation. Typically, to be sustained
they require strong enforcement mechanisms, typically from a network that has already
evolved earlier to enforce other, less costly functions.
It seems that this is precisely what happened in this case study. The latter part of
the story—the formation of the Hanseatic League and its subsequent expansion from a
network of social and political sub-networks to a regulator of merchants’ behavior
outside of the League’s territory, is a form of the evolution anticipated by the theory.

184
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V. Normative Applications and Conclusion
While this paper aims to illuminate an oft-neglected aspect of private ordering
literature—the evolution of private legal systems’ enforcement mechanisms, it also
provides a foundation for some normative analysis. I will briefly suggest three such
applications, in antitrust, critical infrastructure protection and corporate governance. A
summary and conclusion to the paper will follow.
A. Normative Application: Antitrust
Several fields of law, and in particular antitrust and laws regulating network
industries (exchanges, commerce, the internet, telecommunications, energy, etc.) are
predisposed to suspect private networks’ attempts to regulate behavior.188 It is of little
wonder that they do: the ability to regulate behavior is sometimes used by a network to
enforce a cartel, rather than socially beneficial behavior. But policing a cartel is a
Prisoners’ Dilemma game—an expensive game to enforce. Other, social welfare
enhancing forms of regulation often involve functions characterized by less costly game
types—Stag Hunt, Battle of the Sexes, or even Meeting Place.189 Where a network’s
enforcement powers are limited, it may opt to evolve into regulating less costly aspect of
behavior, rather than expensive cartel policing.190
While the evolutionary pattern described in this paper suggests that a
spontaneously formed cartel would not be stable under most circumstances, it also
proposes that cartels may be stable if they make use of the enforcement mechanisms of
lower-cost (and hence more stable) functions (e.g., tight social or religious networks,
exchanges or trade associations, etc.). The analysis of the potential for coordinated effects
should thus shift some of its focus from the market structure in which the suspected cartel
may form to the market structure and characteristics of the lower enforcement cost
networks that may evolve into policing a cartel.
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For a critique of antitrust law’s suspicion of private ordering, see: Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of
Antitrust, 63 Tex. L. Rev. 1, 1-14 (1984).
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For explanations of these games see supra, Sections III.4, III.3, and III.2, respectively.
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See: Bryan Caplan & Edward Stringham, Networks, Anarcho-Capitalism, and the Paradox of
Cooperation (manuscript, May 2001; forthcoming in Review of Austrian Economics), available at:
http://www.gmu.edu/departments/economics/bcaplan/network2.doc.
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By understanding how private legal systems evolve, (public) law will have better
tools to assess the likelihood of a network evolving into an anticompetitive cartel as well
as the opposite case, in which a network evolves (if not hindered by law) into a socially
beneficial private legal system.
B. Normative Application: Critical Infrastructure Protection
Even before the tragic events of September 11, 2001 increased the public’s
sensitivity to homeland security, policymakers realized the need to enhance protection of
critical infrastructure (such as financial, communications, energy and transportation
networks, water distribution systems, etc.). Following a report by the Presidential
Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection, President Clinton issued in 1998
Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 63,191 which aimed not only at enhancing
protection of government owned or controlled critical infrastructure, but also of those
facilities controlled or owned by the private sector (which in some critical infrastructure
sectors, are the majority of facilities).192
PDD 63 recognized a need for information sharing among private firms (in
addition to information sharing between private firms and the government), in order to
enhance both detection of attacks and coordination of defenses. It encouraged the
development of Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISACs), which were to serve
as “mechanism[s] for gathering, analyzing, appropriately sanitizing and disseminating
private sector information to both industry and the [National Infrastructure Protection
Center].”193 PDD 63 did not determine the structure or membership of the ISACs.194
To date, twelve ISACs are in operation, enjoying mixed success.195 Members
from relevant industries cite three causes for a reluctance to share information: (1) fear of
increased liability due to the disclosure of information on vulnerabilities and specific
191

Presidential Decision Directive 63 itself is classified. For a description of its contents see: Critical
Infrastructure Assurance Office, The Clinton Administration’s Policy On Critical Infrastructure Protection:
Presidential Decision Directive 63 (1998), available at: http://www.ciao.gov/resource/paper598.html.
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incidents of attack; (2) risk of antitrust violations resulting from the information
exchange; and (3) Loss of proprietary information, primarily through use of the Freedom
of Information Act to access information disclosed to the ISAC and through it to the
government.196 Some have viewed these concerns as not substantial enough to explain the
limited information exchange that takes place.197 Furthermore, Congress is considering a
bill that would provide exemptions from antitrust laws and the Freedom of Information
Act likely to cover most information sharing done through an ISAC.198
There may be other reasons for the limited information sharing activity among
ISAC members. Collecting information has significant fixed costs and very low variable
costs of dissemination and use by others. Absent some form of enforcement, each ISAC
member faces a Prisoners’ Dilemma game type in deciding whether to collect and share
information or not: If the others are providing her with information, she would be better
off receiving the information but expending no costs in reciprocating. If others—making
the same calculus—fail to share information with her, she would still be better off not
sharing information with the others. Thus, all parties shirk, and no information is shared.
When the contemplated information exchange is made among competitors, as is
the case in most ISACs, an additional concern reduces information sharing further. Since
withholding information from a competitor gives the ISAC member an edge in competing
with her rival, there is a significant hidden cost in sharing the information: tougher
competition from the now more knowledgeable (and thus more effective) rivals.199
Again, this is a Prisoners’ Dilemma game type, in which (absent public or private
enforcement) each ISAC member would refrain from providing information whether she
expects her rival to provide her with information or not.
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The Paradox of Spontaneous Formation of Private Legal Systems/Amitai Aviram

65

The key to overcoming these barriers is, as we alluded, effective enforcement.
Under an assumption that private legal systems form spontaneously, we would expect
every ISAC to police its members and ensure that they share information. But as this
paper demonstrated, high enforcement cost functions do not form spontaneously. They
evolve from pre-existing private legal systems that regulate lower cost functions of the
same parties involved in the high-enforcement cost function.
Thus, an ISAC is unlikely to succeed in regulating information sharing unless it
relied on a pre-existing system that governed the same parties that now require
enforcement of efficient information sharing. Facilitating this reliance on pre-existing
systems may be a consideration in determining ISAC membership: In order to overcome
barriers to information exchange and function effectively, ISAC membership needs to be
similar to the membership of a pre-existing low-cost regulator (such as a tight social or
commercial network). As we have seen earlier in this paper, in such cases the social or
commercial network is likely to assume the responsibility of ensuring that its members
share information with each other despite incentives to shirk.
Currently, ISACs are delineated by industry.200 The industry categories are very
broadly defined, which may result in over-inclusion (i.e., including firms that are in the
same industry but do not transact much with most other members and do not share
membership in a low enforcement cost regulator), as well as under-inclusion (i.e.,
including firms that are not within the same industry, but transact frequently with ISAC
members and are members of the same low enforcement cost regulator).
For example, even if there is a single trade association encompassing all firms in
sectors such as ‘the food industry’ or ‘the information technology industry’, these sectors
involve so many differently situated firms that smaller commercial and social networks
are likely to be more significant in individual firms’ transactions and in the lives of these
firms’ managers. At the same time, these pre-existing networks might encompass others
not in the industry, but with which the firm frequently transacts and would benefit from
sharing information with. By adding these out-of-sector firms into the ISAC, and splitting
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current ISACs into groups that share tight social or commercial networks, information
sharing within the ISAC should increase.201
Thus, a sector-wide membership criteria for ISACs may not be conducive to an
efficient self-enforcement of information sharing.202 This paper shifts the focus, in
facilitating self-enforcing information exchange, to identifying a pre-existing, effective
social or commercial network that may serve as an enforcer of efficient information
sharing. The more the ISAC membership resembles the membership of this pre-existing
network, the lower the barriers would be to efficient information sharing.
This analysis may become especially important if the bill exempting ISAC
members from antitrust laws and FOIA is enacted.203 Any exemption from these laws
carries a social cost that may be offset by a redeeming benefit—the enhanced protection
of critical infrastructure, in this case. But for this tradeoff to be socially beneficial, the
protected ISAC should achieve this redeeming benefit; that is, it should be able to
effectively facilitate information sharing. To do that it must enforce on its members their
commitment to report information they have. Such self-regulation is unlikely to form
spontaneously, but may occur if the ISAC membership is designed to take advantage of
the regulatory abilities of pre-existing private legal systems.
C. Normative Application: Corporate Governance
A series of financial scandals in conspicuous American businesses204 has shaken
public trust in businesses and made some question the ability of corporations, under
201
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current structure and law, to ensure that managers act to maximize the profits of
shareholders (rather than the managers’ own interests).205 This concern spurred
legislation and regulatory action that imposed on managers complex procedures designed
to foster more accountability to shareholders, most notably the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002.206
Both corporation law (which is predominantly state law) and securities law
(which is federal law) accept as their baseline the freedom of parties to design a
corporation and its capital structure in ways they see fit. The laws do not prevent a party
from agreeing to risky or even downright foolish terms. State corporate laws tend to leave
corporate governance arrangements to private ordering, assuming the people forming the
corporation will design the optimal arrangements for that firm. Delaware law, for
example, places most powers and responsibilities in the hands of the board of directors,
subject to a fiduciary duty that is examined ex post.207 Indeed, many firms have devised
arrangements deviating from the default rules on corporate governance, such as requiring
outside directors.208
Federal securities laws, which apply to firms that have made public offerings of
their securities, take a more intrusive, though not unrestrained role in affecting corporate
governance.209 Even prior to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, securities laws imposed extensive
disclosure requirements on management. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and new SEC rules
have expanded the scope of intervention further.

205

Robert W. Hamilton, The Crisis in Corporate Governance: 2002 Style, 40 Hous. L. Rev. 1, 35-40
(2003).
206
Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (to be codified in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.).
On the legislative and regulatory responses to the series of scandals see: Robert B. Thompson, Corporate
Governance After Enron, 40 Hous. L. Rev. 99, 100-107 (2003).
207
Thompson, id., at p. 108-109. As an exception to this principle, there are some actions that require
shareholder votes, such as director elections, approval of mergers and similar transactions, or cleansing
board decisions when board members have conflicts of interest. Id.
208
Thompson, id., at p. 109.
209
The federal government’s involvement in corporate law, mainly through securities regulation, faces
limits dictated by federalism. Though federal laws have increasingly affected corporate law, the Supreme
Court has maintained that state corporate law cannot be displaced by federal law. See, e.g., Cort v. Ash, 422
U.S. 66, 84 (1975) (“Corporations are creatures of state law, and investors commit their funds to corporate
directors on the understanding that, except where federal law expressly requires certain responsibilities of
directors with respect to stockholders, state law will govern the internal affairs of the corporation.”); Santa
Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 479 (1977) (“Absent a clear indication of congressional intent,
we are reluctant to federalize the substantial portion of the law of corporations that deals with transactions
in securities, particularly where established state policies of corporate regulation would be overridden.”).

The Paradox of Spontaneous Formation of Private Legal Systems/Amitai Aviram

68

Behind the increased intervention lies the belief that current laws and existing
private enforcement (whether through privately designed governance structures or
through personal morality of managers) are insufficient to eliminate the incentives
managers have to advance their interests at the expense of shareholders’. But this
intervention is not without costs. First, there are costs expended in complying with the
requirements. Second, tighter regulation might preclude, make too cumbersome or
litigation-prone, certain actions directors can take to increase shareholder value.
Opponents of government intervention note that intervention replaces shareholders’
discretion with government’s, even though government is not as familiar as the
shareholders with the business and the unique circumstances of a given firm, and
furthermore, government does not have the direct incentive that shareholders have to
maximize their wealth. Some scholars suggest that the impetus for the current wave of
corporate governance legislation (and other securities law legislation before it) is not the
realization of calculated, thoughtful new insights on corporate governance, but a cyclical
emotional response to a market crash that ends a speculative bubble.210
Another critique of the government’s response to the series of scandals anticipates
a different cost resulting from detailed, rule-based mandates. According to this critique,
such rules may displace the personal morality of managers, who will feel that following
government’s directive absolves them of additional moral considerations.211 Following
that line of thought, the increase in government regulation may be offset by a decrease in
self-regulation,212 leaving the utility of shareholders unimproved or worse.
Generally, the lower the regulatory abilities (or incentives) of non-government
entities, the more beneficial government regulation would be for shareholders. This paper
provides suggests that in assessing the abilities of private regulators, attention should be
given to the availability of a pre-existing low enforcement cost regulator. In this
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application, two separate regulators need to be considered: potential misbehaving
managers, and the shareholders who are the victims of such misbehavior.
First, the potential malfeasants. Usually, a single manager cannot succeed in his
misbehavior without the cooperation (or at least acquiescence) of one or more other
managers. Each manager incorporated into the scheme can either go along with it or blow
the whistle. This is a Stag Hunt game: if the others go along, the manager would want to
go along with the scheme as well (and reap the profits of the misbehavior). If the others
blow the whistle, so should the manager (in order to mitigate or avoid punishment for the
discovered scheme). But among those two options, the manager would prefer that both he
and the others go along with the plan, rather than both he and the others blow the whistle
(or scrap the plans). The Stag Hunt game is one of moderate enforcement costs—a
regulator of it (i.e., entity that ensures that no one blows the whistle) is unlikely to evolve
spontaneously, but the function is cooperative enough that even a weak pre-existing
regulator (e.g., an ‘old boys’ club’ to which the managers belong) may create sufficient
assurance that ‘no one will blow the whistle’, and therefore all managers would feel
confident enough to cooperate in the misbehavior.
So, we anticipate a higher likelihood of managerial misbehavior if managers who
may know about attempted misbehavior belong to some pre-existing low enforcementcost network. Less powerful networks would suffice to bond the managers, in comparison
to the low enforcement cost networks contemplated in the previous two applications,
since it does not take as much to facilitate cooperation in a Stag Hunt game, as it does to
facilitate cooperation in a Prisoners’ Dilemma game.
The second regulator that needs to be considered, who has an opposite goal of
preventing the misbehavior, is the victim of the managerial misbehavior—the
shareholders. If the managers are part of the same low-enforcement cost function as the
shareholders—for example, if the managers and the shareholders are part of the same
core social network—then regulation by this group is likely to be successful (e.g., the
managers, fearing loss of all of their social capital if their fraud is detected, will not
attempt it). But if the managers are not part of the shareholder’s low enforcement cost
network, the best the shareholders can do is to use the network to detect managers’
misbehavior, and leave punishment—through private and public suits—to the (public)

The Paradox of Spontaneous Formation of Private Legal Systems/Amitai Aviram

70

legal system. This, of course, results in a more limited ability of the shareholders to deter
managerial misbehavior.
In summary, assessing the risk of managerial misbehavior and the abilities of
private regulation of managers requires examination of: (1) whether the managers that are
likely to know of managerial misbehavior (and possibly benefit from it) are members in a
low-enforcement cost network (that would allow them to overcome the Stag Hunt game
and cooperate in the misbehavior). If they are—the risk of managerial misbehavior is
higher; (2) whether the managers that are likely to know of managerial misbehavior are
members in the same low-enforcement cost network as the shareholders. If they are,
private regulation of managerial misbehavior is likely to be effective.
D. Conclusion
The private ordering literature has shed a good deal of light on the efficiency of
norms enforced by private legal systems, the enforcement mechanisms a private legal
system uses to achieve adherence to those norms, and the evolution of the norms.
However, little attention had been paid thus far to the evolution of the enforcement
mechanisms themselves, despite calls by some scholars to study this issue.213 Most
scholarship seems to assume, in the spirit of Coase’s Theorem, that private legal systems
form spontaneously (unless impeded by government) when the benefits to the group
governed by the legal system exceeds the cost of enforcing the system.
As this paper demonstrates, spontaneous formation of private legal systems is
unsuccessful for all but the lowest enforcement cost functions. Private legal systems
formed without the benefit of preexisting enforcement mechanisms suffer from the
paradox of spontaneous formation: to efficiently direct behavior they must ensure the
cooperation of their members, but the effectiveness of the mechanisms used to secure this
cooperation (e.g., the threat of exclusion) depends on the ability to confer benefits to the
members—primarily the ability (not yet existing for a spontaneously formed private legal
system) to efficiently direct behavior.
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As the paper discusses, decentralized bonding (i.e., bonding not achieved through
a centralized, network-based institution; typically bilateral bonds) is unlikely to overcome
the paradox of spontaneous formation at the optimal level of intra-network transactions.
However, this barrier may be overcome by centralized bonding, through an evolutionary
process of extending preexisting networks to regulate higher enforcement cost functions,
making use of the established enforcement mechanisms of the preexisting network.
Enforcement costs of a function depend on several criteria, most of which are
similar to the criteria affecting the stability of a cartel. These criteria include, inter alia,
concentration and competition between networks providing the function;214 concentration
of power among the people using the function;215 the utility conferred by the network to
the members;216 the degree of divergence among members in the amount of utility
derived from the function;217 and the function’s “game type” (e.g., Prisoners’ Dilemma,
Chicken, Battle of the Sexes, Stag Hunt, etc.).218 The criterion of “game type” has not
been explored at all in the literature on cartel stability, because cartels are of a single
game type (Prisoners’ Dilemma). This paper therefore examined expansively the effects
of game types on enforcement costs.219
The evolutionary pattern described in this paper usually begins with the
spontaneous formation and survival of low enforcement cost networks (while higher
enforcement cost functions fail). These networks provide low enforcement cost functions
such as social and spiritual utility.220 After establishing themselves, these networks have
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members would have incentives to degrade the network. On degradation, see Aviram, supra note 11;
Cremer, Rey & Tirole, supra note 112.
216
That is, the importance of the network’s preexisting functions to the members. The greater the benefit
members derive from a function, the stronger the enforcement abilities of a network regulating the function.
217
As mentioned infra, in Section II.3, greater divergence among members’ benefits from a function
increases the cost of agreeing on the optimal regulation, and increases the risk of degradation by the
members who benefit least from the network.
218
A function’s “game type” is the network members’ ranking of preferences between mutual contribution
to the function, mutual defection from the function, contribution to the function while others defect, or
defecting from contribution while others contribute.
219
Supra, Section III.
220
Both of these functions have a Harmony or Meeting Place game types, which are the least expensive to
enforce. See supra, Section III.2.
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enforcement mechanisms capable of regulating higher enforcement cost functions such as
facilitating exchanges and creating markets.221 Upon successful enforcement of these
more expensive (but also very beneficial) functions, the network’s enforcement
mechanisms are augmented, and the network can expand again to yet more expensive
functions (such as mitigating opportunism).222 This gradual expansion of scope,
following a progression in the effectiveness of the network’s enforcement mechanisms, is
the non-spontaneous evolutionary process that creates private legal systems.

Readers with comments should address them to:
Amitai Aviram
George Mason University School of Law
3301 N. Fairfax Drive
Arlington, VA 22201
aaviram@gmu.edu
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Both of which are of the Battle of the Sexes game type. See supra, Section IV.3.
Mitigating opportunism is sometimes a Prisoners’ Dilemma game type and sometimes a Stag Hunt game
type. See supra, Section IV.3.
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